James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current

Honors College

Spring 2017

The practical potential of living authentically
Aaron Minnick
James Madison University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Minnick, Aaron, "The practical potential of living authentically" (2017). Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current. 352.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/352

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior
Honors Projects, 2010-current by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
dc_admin@jmu.edu.

The Practical Potential of Living Authentically
_______________________
An Honors College Project Presented to
the Faculty of the Undergraduate
College of Arts & Letters
James Madison University
_______________________
by Aaron M. Minnick
May 2017

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Philosophy & Religion, James Madison University, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors College.
FACULTY COMMITTEE:

HONORS COLLEGE APPROVAL:

Project Advisor: Steven Hoeltzel, Ph.D.
Professor, Philosophy & Religion

Bradley R. Newcomer, Ph.D.,
Dean, Honors College

Reader: Patrick Fleming, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Philosophy & Religion

Reader: Mark Piper, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Philosophy & Religion

PUBLIC PRESENTATION
This work is accepted for presentation, in part or in full, at Cleveland Hall 114 on Friday, April 21st.

The Practical Potential of

Living Authentically

“A man must have a code.”
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Preface
To paraphrase George Orwell, the best books are those that tell us what we already know.
Perhaps, then, this thesis will ring most strikingly in the minds of those who have realized a deep
dissatisfaction with the universal ethics of the day. Consequently, it is not the final word on the
matter, but an exploration of a more practical ethic of living authentically. The paper deals with what
I take to be the central question of philosophy: How should I live? It shows, I believe, that the proper
vantage point to begin that inquiry can be at all times none other than the subjective. The whole
sense of the paper might be summed up in the opening epitaph: “A man must have a code.”
Thus, the aim of the paper is to provide a foundation upon which the individual might start
to construct his/her own practical-theory for how to live a life in tune with his/her desires. Its
purpose will have been achieved if it proves useful and enjoyable to one person who reads and
resonates with it. Although this work sits squarely within the tradition and style of analytic
philosophy, I think its contents will prove of interest to anyone with the fortitude to read it through
to completion, regardless of philosophical training or inclination. The value of the present work,
then, lies not in its ambition to transcend philosophy, but in its effort to make it relevant and
accessible. To the extent that this value is duly clear, I hope the reader will find him/herself oriented
in the direction of greater freedom by a lucid recognition that it is not necessary to accept life as it
has been presented.
A. M.

Harrisonburg, 2017
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I. Introduction
“In ethics,” Bernard Williams provocatively notes, “reflection can destroy knowledge.” 1 Despite its
apparent opacity, this cinder block of a statement’s implications are so stark and so pertinent that it
is worth chipping away at anyway. While we can certainly reflect and philosophize in cozy offices
and classrooms, at meetings and academic conferences, the type of reflection Williams has in mind
here often arises naturally, (not to mention with more force), in other, less stable conditions. In the
face of genuine adversity, rather than something dreamed up from the armchair, our conscious
reasoning is sufficiently shaken up and confused, thus prompting us, often inadvertently, to question
what we thought we “knew.” Perhaps, before our intimate experience with adversity, we had a firm
grasp on what our duty was, or how a person ought to behave given the circumstances—but now
we’re not so sure. Fittingly then, one of the most puzzling moral dilemmas to come out of Western
philosophy was not developed in a seminal article, but arose from a conversation Sartre had with a
former student. Sartre recounts the exchange:
His elder brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment
somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. His mother was living alone with him, deeply
afflicted…by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But he, at this
moment, had the choice between going to England to join the Free French Forces or of staying near his
mother and helping her to live. 2

As Sartre himself recalls only a few paragraphs later, no ethic, religious or otherwise, could possibly
be of service to the young man as he sweats his fate—whatever ethical knowledge he may have had,
reflection had destroyed it. As Daniel Dennett adds on a related note that applies equally to both our
dire and more mundane concerns, “How on Earth could anyone prioritize that cacophony? Not by
any systematic process of considering all things, weighing expected utilities, and attempting to
maximize. Nor by any systematic generation and testing of Kantian maxims—there are too many to

Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2006), 148. His emphasis.
Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, trans. Philip Mairet, ed. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Meridian, 1957), 295-296.
1
2
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consider.” 3 The cacophony he refers to, of course, is the accumulated sum of human ethical
‘knowledge,’ all of which appears plausible on first pass, and yet nevertheless begins to break down
upon further reflection. In other words, regardless of the truth and validity of the classic, dominant
strands of moral theory, our toolkit for relating to the practical side of everyday life remains
inadequate. It is with the hope of patching this hole that we offer authenticity as a much-needed
practical solution.
The aim of the present work, then, is to explore authenticity as an alternative framework for
practical, ethical deliberation that we might use to navigate our everyday lives more compellingly
than if we were limited to the means offered by more comprehensive moral theories. Through the
lens of authenticity as it manifests itself to us personally, we may find that some ways of being and
behaving thereby endorsed do not square neatly with the recommendations offered by other moral
theories (much in the same way that their prescriptions often conflict with each other.) To some
degree, disagreement of this sort is to be expected—it should not, however, be misconstrued as a
signal that total war between the two is upon us. Though playing the same sport (viz., ethics), they
remain firmly in different leagues, seeking an answer to different questions: authenticity attempts to
answer the question, “How should I live, in this moment?” whereas a consequentialist or
deontologist would be concerned with the more tempered question, “What actions are right or
wrong in particular circumstances?” (And a virtue ethicist would ask, “How should one live?”) We
will explore convergences and divergences concerning the practical component of contemporary
moral theories more thoroughly in the middle sections of this paper; for now, let it suffice to say
that, given its reluctance to provide a ready-made formula for explaining what makes an act
unethical, authenticity is not so much attempting to usurp a given moral theory wholesale as it is to
augment the practical dimension where it falls short.
3

Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 509.
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To the extent that all ethics research must organize itself around three logical steps to be
both coherent and effective, we can accordingly frame our discussion around the following threepronged approach, taken sequentially: What? So what? Now what? In other words, we will begin by
developing a clear, working understanding of what authenticity is and how we intend to refer to it.
For the purposes of our discussion, (and we will discuss it at length) authenticity at its most basic
level can be understood as a state of being whereby the individual in question is fully conscious,
aware, and understanding of her motives, actions, and, to the extent possible, implications thereof.
In this picture, the authentic individual resonates more with Nietzsche’s positive life affirmation
than his negative rejection of the herd. To study this notion further will entail following the lineage
of authenticity as it precipitates down through the annals of Western philosophy from Kierkegaard
to Camus. Despite their common subject matter, their thought on authenticity is often
contradictory—the upshot of this observation, of course, is that we will take care to note what
appears useful in our more general pursuit of developing a practical approach true to certain facts
regarding human motivation (among other things, to be discussed later at length), and discard the
rest as we analyze these thinkers. We will then explore and unpack the main themes of authenticity
to further flesh out our definition, namely, subjectivity, desire, ground projects, and presence.
Having clearly established what we mean by authenticity, we will turn to a discussion of why
we should care (that is, so what?). It is here that we will devote space to a discussion of the ways in
which authenticity diverges and converges with other leading ethical theories within the context of their
practical action guiding components. Less emphasis will be placed on theory since, with respect to
authenticity, this must largely be supplied by the individual. Here, our primary goal will be twofold:
we wish to demonstrate not only how authenticity addresses a set of genuine, practical concerns
where others are more silent (viz., divergences), but also how authenticity is linked to its
predecessors in ethical thought (viz., convergences). Despite our hesitation to pit authenticity against
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more established moral theories, we must to be careful not to overstate its originality by separating it
from the ethical tradition in which it is undoubtedly rooted. To avoid alienation, special emphasis
will be placed on the degree to which authenticity piggybacks off its parents by responding to the
same fundamental concerns. It is not ideological battle we wish to do here, but rather creative
rethinking. Following this relational groundwork, we will survey a few common objections to
authenticity before contending that they need not be legitimate concerns for the individual inclined
to inject a dose of authenticity into her life. In the process, we will examine the metaethical and
metaphysical foundations on which authenticity resides. For those who have found our ideas
convincing to that point, we will offer a brief “user’s manual” of sorts to orient the reader as we
move beyond the scope of this paper. Given how prominently practicality is featured throughout
this paper, a failure to address the “now what?” question that will assuredly assert itself to anyone
convinced by our presentation would be laughably shortsighted. It is in this spirit that we offer a
general, straightforward walkthrough for how the individual might begin to realize authenticity in
her own life.
To prevent our discussion from becoming unwieldy, we will settle for foregrounding only
those issues which directly speak to the what, so what, now what framework we have delineated
above, rather than indulging the impossible (albeit interesting) breadth and depth a truly
comprehensive treatment of these issues would require. Such an approach is well-suited to the task
at hand and will allow us to avoid missing the forest for the trees. Bearing all the above in mind, if
our work is sufficiently cogent, a full and genuine return to Socrates’ famed dictum that “the
unexamined life is not worth living” will have been initiated. 4

4Plato,

The Apology, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Cambridge: Internet Classics Archine, 2009), 38a.
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II.

Authenticity
It is difficult to conceptually analyze authenticity in the way that we would analyze, say,

justice, due in part to its highly relational character. Indeed, authenticity cannot exist in a vacuum:
Without the notion of inauthenticity, it loses all sense of meaning. Of course, one could argue that
justice too depends on a co-arising knowledge of injustice; but in the latter case, the relationship is far
less pronounced, at least in origin and intention. Furthermore, the difficulty in nailing down a fixed
understanding of authenticity becomes even more obvious when we consider the implications of
that relational nature as it turns on the individual in question. In some sense, authenticity stems so
immediately from the individual that it becomes difficult to understand it except in negative terms,
or what it is not. Still, a common spirit or orientation may be teased out if nothing else. This
orientation, which obviously can and will manifest itself in myriad ways depending on the relevant
context of the agent in question, is fundamentally a turn inward to that which is always with us.
Although informed through dialogue with our respective environments, this internal wisdom does
not depend on further resources beyond that which we have at our present disposal by virtue of
being human to respond adequately, though its guidance can often prove helpful if properly
integrated. It calls to mind the myth of the hero’s journey: a constant discovery, navigation, and
interpretation of our respective worlds, in which the landscape is constantly shifting so that the only
invariant constraint is death. This inward orientation will, with any luck, give cohesive form to a life
that will, ideally, call forth all thoughts, words, and actions from this consciously chosen seat of self.
In the process of understanding this personal approach on the most universal level possible,
two key motifs emerge: desire and ground projects. Evolving from the inward orientation noted
above, as well as from a commitment to moment-to-moment awareness to meet the subtleties of
everyday life, desire and ground projects run the gamut of what it means to live in the world given
the unique set of concerns and relationships each person possesses. Desire responds to the
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fundamental who, what, and why of existence, and ground projects respond to the when, where, and
how—although of course there is more overlap than this rigid dichotomy suggests. It is these two
motifs, alongside the recurrent themes of subjectivity and presence that give physical form to that
we will examine successively in the meat of this paper. Through a critical inquiry into the works of
the major figures who have spoken at length about these issues, we will advance an understanding of
how these characteristics developed into the working conception of authenticity we will employ
moving forward. To the greatest extent possible, we will rely on primary sources of these individual
thinkers, opting to contextualize the works as they are, rather than indulge in the interpretation
fractals that abound in secondary literature. By weaving these themes and motifs together in their
present state, we will glean in greater detail the sense for the ideal they convey.
1. The Men of Authenticity
Speaking in the negative, one could say the authentic individual rejects unconscious
compliance with external authority. At its most essential, authenticity advocates a return to the
individual as the source of what matters and how it matters. 5 By examining the following thinkers,
we will get a sense for how our present understanding of authenticity has trickled down through the
ages.
A. Kierkegaard
In the early 1830s, Søren Kierkegaard began his personal search for authenticity which,
somewhat ironically, would spearhead a tradition that has continued to flourish since its inception,
carrying with it a continuity of style and orientation, if not content. In what is perhaps the
quintessential statement of the authentic individual groping his way through life, Kierkegaard
remarks on his desperate attempt to break from the Hegelian tradition’s emphasis (shared by much

5 Granted, authenticity’s historical roots could be said to stretch all the way back to Descartes and his “I” centered approach, though
it was not until Kierkegaard that the methodology was (Plato, Apology 2009) allowed to spread out by ceasing to place the use of
abstract reasoning over and above all other sources of knowledge.
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of philosophy in his day) on the pursuit of knowledge in favor of the pursuit of something more
essential and intimate to Kierkegaard himself: “The crucial thing is to find a truth which is truth for
me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die.” 6 This primacy of subjective truth over
objective truth became Kierkegaard’s primary preoccupation for the remainder of his life. Indeed, in
the same journal entry, he further remarks on his aim: “to lead a complete human life and not
merely one of understanding, so that I should not…base the development of my thought
upon…something that is called objective…but upon something which grows together with the
deepest roots of my life.” 7 It is hard to understate just how radical a break from the contemporary
history of Western philosophy Kierkegaard’s thought represented. In an era in which philosophy
was conjoined with science to the greatest extent possible, a resuscitation of the Ancient Greek
ideal 8 that it is the individual who is the primary subject of concern, rather than the principles and
metaphysical truths that he was expected to embody, was the ultimate triumph in the face of
philosophy’s unconscious trend toward self-alienation of those it claimed to apply to.
We can already see quite early on in his journal entries, haphazardly dashed off, that the
central maxim of his philosophy was beginning to take shape: “One must learn to know himself
before knowing anything else. Not until a man has inwardly understood himself and then sees the
course he is to take does his life gain peace and meaning.” 9 These early writings, however, would not
be sufficient to understand Kierkegaard’s thought without at least mentioning his subsequent
critique of inauthentic modes of living. 10 In these later writings, Kierkegaard would stress the
leveling effect that society seemed to press on the unsuspecting, citing it as the primary cause for the

Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, ed. Alexander Drew (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 16.
Ibid, 16.
8 Although Kierkegaard was not directly inspired by the Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition as it was known then and understood
today, his masters thesis, On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates shows his great admiration for the Greek thought of
that time.
9 Ibid, 17. Reference to the Socratic injunction is immediately evident here as well.
10 Although he is undoubtedly discussing authenticity and inauthenticity in his writings, he also undoubtedly predated the terms
themselves.
6
7
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symptomatic “despair” 11 among the masses. What is perhaps Kierkegaard’s most shocking and
characteristic leap of faith comes with his conclusion that, ultimately, the way out of this despair is
not through an isolated self-overcoming à la Nietzsche, but rather through sublimating the self in
service of something greater outside of oneself. For Kierkegaard, of course, this external source was
his relationship to God and the Christian Faith, so that the whole of his life was “related to the
problem of ‘becoming a Christian,’ with a direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous illusion
we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land of ours, all are Christians of a sort.” 12
In some sense, the whole of Kierkegaard’s thought on authenticity can be deduced from this
posthumous turn of phrase. There is nothing in authenticity in the most general sense that entails
any relationship to Christianity, any religion, or any need to anchor the self in something external in
order to escape the characteristic existential despair, as Kierkegaard terms it. Such specifics are best
seen as Kierkegaard’s own manifestation of authenticity, consciously chosen and wrestled with
against a backdrop of inauthentic and misunderstood Christianity, which he charges the masses with
blindly following and failing to comprehend, often for a lack of trying. 13 It is this insight that
Kierkegaard has to offer us on the nature of authenticity. Namely, its inherently troubled
relationship with unreflective, inauthentic modes of living (indeed, the two arise simultaneously), and
its practical, subjective orientation as opposed to the theoretical, objective bent often, though not
necessarily, associated with inauthenticity. That said, while we could talk of Kierkegaard endlessly, I
believe the above suffices for our purposes of illuminating the origins of authenticity, articulated
explicitly.
B. Nietzsche

See Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 144.
Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, ed. & trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1962), 5.
13 Or so he charges in the Provocations (Farmington, PA: The Bruderhof Foundation Inc., 2002), 201: “The Bible is very easy to
understand. But we Christians are a bunch of scheming swindlers. We pretend to be unable to understand it because we know very
well that the minute we understand, we are obliged to act accordingly.”
11
12
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“God is Dead,” 14 declared Nietzsche, and with this began his sweeping deconstruction of
the whole heavenly host of super-physical ethical codes, from the God of Christianity to Kant’s God
of Pure Reason. No longer could we rely on otherworldly entities of unbridled power and
omnipotence for guidance—instead, argues Nietzsche, we must learn to remake ourselves as the
God, challenging us once more to turn within. In many ways, Nietzsche simply runs a parallel
project to that of Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard’s despair at the hands of an alienating society is
Nietzsche’s loathing for herd instinct; 15 Kierkegaard’s solution in the authentic relationship to God
and faith is mirrored in Nietzsche’s idolization of the artist and of nature as key for the full
realization of Zarathustra’s Übermensch to manifest itself. If Kierkegaard’s response to inauthenticity
is centered on a total re-envisioning of our personal relationship with the divine, then Nietzsche’s
claim that God is Dead and subsequent complete rejection of transcendence seems diametrically
opposed; this difference, however, is only superficial. In both cases, these two pioneers advocate for
a uniquely authentic conception of the ideal response to the leveling effect of the masses. It is
important to note that neither argues for the supremacy of their personal approach in any objective
or logically rigorous sense. The authors depend on emotional appeals and rhetorical flourishes to get
their point across, an intentional stylistic decision they viewed as a strength rather than a weakness.
That said, to understand that decision as wholesale rejection of a rational foundation for authenticity
would be to undersell their thought. Neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche were moral relativists in the
strict sense—instead, they believed their approach, which turned on a dethroning of reason and
sense perception as the only legitimate sources of human knowledge, to be more faithful to specific,
further facts regarding the concrete intimacy of the human experience. Often relegated to the
margins by the philosophical tradition that came before them, they found these further facts too
important to be ignored.
14
15

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 109.
See Ibid, 210. Thus they locate the problem of inauthenticity to which the authentic individual must respond in a similar place.
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In any case, supremacy of the conscious self-supervision over thoughtless conformity,
exemplified by Nietzsche’s aphorism, “every man is a unique miracle,” 16 is upheld and an unofficial
tradition is born. Authenticity’s legacy, no longer relegated to a one-off philosophical event,
demonstrates both its staying power and versatility with Nietzsche. Though neither thinker would
have viewed their respective projects so contingently, the benefits of hindsight allow us to
understand both Kierkegaard’s authentic Christian faith and Nietzsche’s Übermensch as the
particular ground projects they undertook in their drive to live authentically, rather than expressions of
some ultimate invariant standard for humanity to aspire to. Whether these thinkers perceived their
own ideals so objectively is of little consequence—if authenticity is to be a live option for all (indeed,
I see nothing in the term that should preclude such an interpretation), then a greater variability in
manifest expression must be allowed for. 17
C. Heidegger
It is not until Heidegger that Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s proto-existentialism begins to
take on its form that remains most distinct from the pop psychology notions of authenticity
currently present. The transition into Heidegger also marks the first time ‘authenticity’ is explicitly
used in that specific form; before, we were only working backwards with shared concepts. While
responding to the same basic concern as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche using his own personal
terminology, 18 namely that there is something deeply troubling about the way the individual relates
to the society at large, both his solution and approaching angle are notably shifted. To that effect,
Heidegger remarks that, “temptation, tranquilization, and alienation are distinguishing marks of a

16 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 201.
17 As an aside, both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard discuss the concept of eternal recurrence in their writings (though it features more
prominently in Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard refers to it as “repetition.” Regardless of the particular ground project endorsed, I think
both would agree that to live authentically is to continually consider the possibility of eternal return and to subsequently be at peace
with it.
18 Fittingly, the decision to employ distinct terminology to refer to philosophically similar ideas became a hallmark of writing on
authenticity. This trend found perhaps its most opulent expression in Heidegger.
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kind of Being called falling,” characterized as the automatic response to “the They…the way things
have been publicly interpreted.” 19 In this case, the They stands in as the inauthentic mode of living
and falling can be understood as the unconscious relation to the public consciousness rather than
one’s own. In a slight departure from Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, Heidegger takes care to emphasize
that falling is not some “bad or deplorable ontic property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages
of human culture might be able to rid themselves.” 20 Given the necessity of the social world we find
ourselves inescapably lodged in, falling with the ‘they’ is something to be worked with rather than
fought against; to use Heideggerian terminology, we cannot help but ‘care.’ Ultimately, we reclaim
ourselves from this inauthentic mode of existence by relating to death as a distinct possibility for
ourselves in any given moment rather than a distant event that merely happens to other people. On
Heidegger’s account, it is “the ‘they’ [that] covers up what is peculiar in death’s certainty—that it is
possible at any moment.” 21 Of course, we know, upon reflection, that the former is clearly true and
yet we live our lives as if truth was contained wholly in the latter. This distinction, interestingly,
elucidates the major break Heidegger makes from his predecessors: authenticity has less to do with
‘being true to oneself’ and everything in the world to do with being true to the facts of existence,
including our ‘thrownness’ into the world in which our preoccupation with practical matters is
strikingly conducive to falling.
I am, of course, simplifying the discussion immensely, as it is not my aim to recapitulate the
entirety of Heidegger’s ontology, in which authenticity comprises a significant, yet ultimately singular
cog in a vast network of interrelated phenomena. The central nugget, as it were, is that while
Heidegger’s critique of society runs along similar fault lines to that of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, his
response is much more universalized. The fact that Dasein took a backseat to Being in his later

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harpers and Row, 1962), 253-254.
Ibid, 220.
21 Ibid, 30.
19
20
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writings should come as no surprise. For Heidegger, the immutable type facts about the world that
we find ourselves thrown into are not obstacles to be eschewed, but opportunities to relate and
integrate these constraints into our overarching life as a self-chosen way of being. In many ways, this
re-conception is far less radical a response than has been proposed in the past. Rather than make a
clean break from a profoundly sick and mind-numbing social world, the critique is muted by the
claim that society as such cannot be escaped. The best we can do is to learn to relate to our world in
a more honest way.
Thus, authenticity is not indicative of some deeper nature to be discovered in an instant as
an understanding of one’s fate, but rather is uncovered moment-to-moment as our narrative
unfolds. Though individual actions and temporally brief ground projects (when balanced against an
entire life) may seem disjointed at first blush, Heidegger is quick to note that these events, taken
cumulatively, constitute the whole of our being. The unity of a singular life, understood without
reference to a deeper, more fundamental nature, coupled with the insistence that the individual does
not have to reject the social world of the herd in order to live authentically further fill out our notion
of authenticity.
D. Sartre
“Man is condemned to be free,” writes Sartre, “and from the moment he is thrown into this
world he is responsible for everything that he does.” 22 Sartre, widely known as authenticity’s most
fervent advocate (at least early in life), sought to wrestle as much from transcendence as he possibly
could. One cannot utter his famed expression, “existence comes before essence” 23 without being
struck by the monumental ethical implications entailed by such a claim. Namely, that, in a world
where the only value that exists is created by us, our primary point of reference necessarily shifts

Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, trans. Philip Mairet, ed. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Meridian, 1957), 295.
23 Ibid, 289.
22
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from the objective to the subjective. The chain that began with Kierkegaard remains, in a significant
sense, unbroken. Building too on Heidegger’s notion of ‘thrownness,’ Sartre comments on our
‘facticity’—the set of relevant facts about ourselves and our situation that inform and constrain our
action. Unlike Heidegger, however, Sartre places far less emphasis on this facticity, arguing that, as
humans, we possess the capability to transcend rather than reconcile with these facts. We are radically
free to decide (an in effect, create) what is meaningful for our individual selves at will, and it is the
whole of our responsibility to do so.
For a man whose magnum opus, Being and Nothingness, hinged so principally on an inward
revolution in the life of the individual, it seems, at first pass, surprising to note that Sartre was far
and away the most politically minded and active of the aforementioned thinkers. In some sense,
even Sartre himself was convinced that his project centered on the individual had failed: “One
cannot be converted alone. In other words, ethics is not possible unless everyone is ethical.” 24 ‘Bad
faith,’ originally Sartre’s critique of individuals who inadvertently deceive themselves by living as if
they have a particular, inescapable role or function to fill, slowly evolved into a societal critique. In
his later works, Sartre maintained that until society’s oppressive power structures were sufficiently
addressed, the possibility of the fully authentic individual self-actualizing in isolation remained little
more than a fantasy, though an enticing one at that.
Our takeaways from Sartre more or less split the difference in every case: although perhaps
not quite as radical as Sartre envisioned it, we are, generally speaking, far freer and far guiltier of
living in bad faith than we typically perceive ourselves to be in everyday life. Recognizing this
cognitive dissonance can be considered the first step to living authentically. Furthermore, his later
emphasis on the interplay between self, others, and systems is vastly important—to remain ignorant
of their effects may be to endorse yet another form of bad faith. Despite his eventual shift away
24

Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 9.
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from the latent power of the individual to transform her own life without the input of society, Sartre
continued to embrace some of the key methodological approaches to ethics that unofficially mark those
who came before him; namely, his insistence that it was literary, rather than solely analytic works
that would incite his readers to pursue the authentic ideal, regardless of whether it remained
perfectly attainable in the final calculation. Thus it should come as no surprise that he affirmed this
hierarchical priority toward the end of his life: “I would like [people] to remember Nausea, No Exit
and The Devil and the Good Lord, and then my two philosophical works.…” 25
E. Camus
Incorporating Camus into the fold, we complete our sketch of authenticity as it evolved
through the Western philosophical canon. 26 Camus, in many ways, seems to complete the circle: he
aligns himself, both in his own and my estimations, more closely with his ancestors than with his
contemporaries. Though they are responding to the same basic problem (Kierkegaard calls the state
‘despair’ while Camus prefers ‘the absurd’), Camus rejects Kierkegaard’s call to transcendence in
favor of absolute immanence: “Between this sky and the faces turned toward it there is nothing on
which to hang a mythology, a literature, an ethic, or a religion… no superhuman happiness, no
eternity outside the curve of the days.” 27 Accordingly, Camus finds fraternity with Nietzsche more
readily than any other thinker. Camus’ insistence on embracing the absurdity of living in a world
whose meaning, if existent, is humanely impossible to discern, puts him in good company with
Nietzsche’s life-affirming Übermensch. In other words, although we are unable to free ourselves

Max Charlesworth, The Existentialists and Jean-Paul Sartre, (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1976), 154.
Of course, the authors discussed at length above do not constitute everyone who has had something of consequence to say on the
matter. For further reading, see Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity for a descendent treatment and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
Confessions for a precursor. Additional thinkers of no less importance include Jacob Golomb, Erich Fromm, and Alessandro Ferrara
among others. Far from being utterly insignificant, these thinkers have expanded on (or, in the case of Rousseau, alluded to) the
notion of authenticity in several meaningful ways; chief among them are objections and subsequent responses to the ideas developed
above in the main body. In the interest of sticking to what is and has been most essential, original, and influential, I have chosen to
limit my primary discussion to the five thinkers above.
27 Albert Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays, ed. Philip Thody, trans. Ellen Conroy Kennedy (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 90.
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from “this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this need for clarity and cohesion,” 28 the
appropriate response is not to evade the dilemma by means of a comforting, yet ultimately escapist
approach (religion at best, suicide at worst), but rather to accept the absurd in the subtlest shades of
gray and confusion. By rejecting out of hand all transcendent solutions to immanent concerns,
Camus reaffirms the central motif of authenticity: only we, as subjects, are fit to confront the
difficulties and paradoxes of existence—no suitable system for navigating these stormy seas can or
could possibly exist. In the spirit of completing the circle, his penchant for writing both
philosophical and literary works reaffirms the central methodological conviction from Kierkegaard
through Sartre: philosophy without fiction is dead words; fiction without philosophy is trivial
amusement.
2. Main Themes of Authenticity
A. Pathos
The notion which is the object of our search has just been introduced and traced back
through its historical origins. Along the way, a few key concepts have been teased out. Namely, a
subjective vantage point to base our inquiry; the presence of mind required to conduct that inquiry
in full awareness of its drives, origins, and implications; the primacy of ground projects as the practical,
visible manifestation of our inquiry and efforts to live authentically; and the role of authenticity
within society and the relationship between the authentic individual and the greater whole. To the
foundation these thinkers have constructed, we will add another layer still by integrating the essential
phenomenon of desire as the manner that our authenticity reveals itself to us. While further
expanding on the above themes and motifs in the proceeding sections we must bear in mind that, at
this point, our intention is merely to elucidate what the virtue of authenticity consists in rather than
to lay it down as a prescription.
28
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The only recurring methodological approach presented above that is too out of place to
warrant more attention in our exploration is the penchant for literary flair that so many shared.
These fictional appeals, employed liberally, were designed to persuade by means of pathos over logos. 29
Authenticity’s inaugural Hall of Fame class was not so naïve as to think that they could rationally
argue for the absolute moral superiority of authentic living without trading off for an unacceptable
degree of freedom and flexibility that made the notion so attractive to begin with. To that effect,
Sartre, undertaking a project that I believe all of the aforementioned writers would advocate for, set
out to “repudiate the spirit of seriousness” which “considers values transcendent givens independent
of human subjectivity.” 30 Put otherwise, he recognized the futility of attempting to uphold the
authentic life as the ultimate standard of virtue, equally as much as he would argue that Kant’s
categorical imperative is founded on a delusion—that delusion, of course, being the spirit of
seriousness. I will save a deeper examination of the spirit of seriousness for later in this paper, but
for now let it suffice to say that for these thinkers, the deeper emotional, intuitive appeal did not
take an ideological backseat to the strictly logical, rational approach that philosophy has traditionally
consigned itself to. This is only further evidenced by the fact that, at the ends of their respective
lives, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were personally much more satisfied with their individual appeals
than were Heidegger and Sartre with the more universal projects they attempted to set out. Of
course, this is not to say that the philosophers in question lacked rational underpinning for their
views; but rather that they acknowledged, given what we know about the human subject, that the
logos does not, in and of itself, occupy a space any more privileged as the vehicle for philosophical
truth than appeals to other method. (And in fact, with respect to authenticity, it may not sufficiently
shake us out of our unreflective tendencies to have the effect it so desires—but more on that deeper

29 The notable exception to this, of course, is Heidegger, though his respect and admiration for art, poetry in particular, is undeniable.
See Heidegger’s Poetry, Language, Thought for more detailed thoughts.
30 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1993), 626.
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into the paper.) That my own inquiry into authenticity should be so resolutely analytic rather than
literary is admittedly somewhat regrettable. Given the nature of the beast, however, I must be
satisfied to let clarity and a lucid awareness of the irony of my own situation stand in where an
emotional appeal may be lacking.
B. Subjectivity
Having dispensed with our literary concerns, let us return to that inward orientation we have
been frequently mentioning. In our opening remarks on authenticity, we noted the dilemma that
many thinkers who preceded us were confronted with when attempting to articulate a full bodied,
consistent notion of authenticity. Although efforts to sketch a positive picture of authenticity were
fraught with difficulty, the solution resolved even more problems than were originally posed,
because it allowed us to simultaneously illuminate the other central relationship present, namely, that
between the individual and society. Despite the authentic individual’s emphasis on a complete turn
toward subjectivity as the origin of meaning and significance, they never forgot what they were
reacting against and what provided the raw materials for seekers of authenticity to reclaim and
appropriate in a more personal way. The social world provides the backdrop through which the
individual struggles to ground himself in what ultimately matters to him and not as the result of some
unconscious mechanism pulling the strings. That man and society are inevitably related is hardly a
debatable fact. Even the most seemingly spontaneous free acts and thoughts of the individual are
generated out of and in response to a set of unique stimuli present in one’s external environment.
For all its emphasis on subjectivity as the starting point and rampant individualism that superficially
seems to follow from it as the most admirable personal way of life, construing the search for
authenticity as a primarily solitary affair is an understandable misstep. Our social world is created at
birth through our inevitable relationship with, at the bare minimum, a mother, and likely continues
to expand and contract in varying degrees of intensity until death. Viewed thusly, that our personal
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relationship with society exists is a brute fact. How we relate to our social world is constantly up for
grabs, however, and here authenticity finds its foothold as a possible orientation for that
relationship. We have been given the picture with the black-and-white lines already etched in place;
it is our responsibility, or rather our privilege to color the picture with whatever combination of the
rainbow that suits our fancy.
To further add shading to this notion, let us examine the work of Bernard Williams who,
rather unusually among contemporary Anglophone philosophers, spoke out against the prevailing
ethics of his (and our) time. Although he betrays his Greek sympathies from time to time, he
certainly falls short of a vigorous defense of the Nicomachean Ethics and thus finds a compatriot in
Nietzsche, among others, in light of his penchant to argue negatively in the process. That is, he
attempts to revise ethics by decrying the woes of both consequentialism and deontology without
offering something substantive to fill the hole left in their wake. In the bulk of his writings, a
sustained critique of each of these ethical systems can be found. These critiques, however, are in
truth only more specialized applications of a broader and equally devastating attack on moral
systemization more generally, including its insistence on abusing the moral ought (used categorically,
though not necessarily referencing Kant) when, instead, “It would be most reasonable to drop it….
You can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle.” 31 The men of authenticity,
thus identified, too have emphatically demonstrated that the moral ought is no more necessary for
ethics than it is helpful, a point that we hope to show convincingly by the end of this paper.
Likewise, the impartial ethical systems seem unacceptable to Williams for precisely the same reason:

31 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 33 (1958): 8. Anscombe, largely credited
with reviving the virtue ethics tradition, precluded Williams on several key ethical issues, though certainly not all or even most of
them.
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“The… undertaking has never succeeded, and could not succeed, in answering the question, by what
right does it legislate the moral sentiments?” 32
C. Ground projects
Williams, however, is not satisfied by merely raising the metaethical concerns just mentioned,
which we will address in greater detail later in this paper. He also raises another, perhaps more
interesting, practical concern about the ability of these moral theories to accomplish what they set out
to do. To wit, “There cannot be any very interesting, tidy or self-contained theory of what morality
is, nor… can there be an ethical theory… [that] will yield a decision procedure for moral
reasoning,” 33 because these ethical theories simply demand too much of the individual. Regardless of
the demands imposed on us by either deontological or consequentialist moral theories, they will
inevitably fail to supersede the importance of our own “ground projects” 34 to us (and, on the off
chance that they do, it seems more reasonable to say that adhering to, say, Kantian moral theory is
one of our ground projects more so than that it is a genuine glimpse into the moral underpinnings of
our universe applied universally without exception). These “ground projects provide the motive
force which propels [us] into the future, and gives [us] a reason for living.” 35 Yet the essential
characteristics of these ground projects are inherently soft and flexible. They are not necessarily selfcentered or at odds with the ground projects of others, in the sense that we must claim sole
ownership over their expressed content. Rather, these ground projects are ours in the sense that they
are consciously chosen by us, for us: they have to mean something to us, they have to matter.
Notably, this sort of approach is directly at odds with the straightforward prescriptions of
both consequentialism and deontology, among other moral systems that are less forgiving of
deviance and nuance. The consequentialist would be forced to give up her ground projects in the
Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), x.
Ibid, ix-x.
34 Ibid, 12.
35 Ibid, 13.
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name of maximizing utility; the deontologist would have to respect persons’ autonomy impartially
without regard to the specific individuals involved. A few examples should help to clarify and
substantiate this claim. To invoke the moral dilemma we posed at the outset of this paper, if we
picture the young man as having a ground project, then the prior dilemma becomes a non-issue.
Let’s say his ground project, in that moment, was to avenge his brother’s death. A Kantian might
appeal to a universal maxim against killing our fellow man, or even against revenge more generally.
A utilitarian might conjure up a balance sheet of pluses and minuses, determining that he ought to
remain with his mother since his lack of military expertise would most surely result in his quick
demise and additional anguish for his mother. And yet, in spite of their prescriptions to the contrary,
he heads to the Western front anyway to live out the truth of his ground project and attempt to do
right by his brother. Another, more domestic (yet no less consequential) example that accentuates
the uncertainty factor: It is easy to conceive of a woman, raised in a conservative religious
household, who has now been impregnated during a one night stand. As a first-generation college
student, she is now faced with the decision of whether to drop out of school to raise the child, give
it up for adoption, or have an abortion. How could either the consequentialist or the deontologist
have anything helpful to say on the matter? Surely, a young girl of 18 could not be expected to hand
down a universal maxim regarding abortion. Perhaps a maxim could be formulated not to lie to your
parents—though she knows they would surely disown her were they to learn she had an abortion.
Or, perhaps, the true overriding maxim is to act in the best interest of the child—this is where the
consequentialists come into play, though they will be equally frustrated in their attempt to hand
down a suitable judgment. Given the barest of facts she finds herself equipped with, it is resolutely
inconceivable that a human being could have any hope of determining what course of action would
bring about the best consequences. Of course, we could continue this speculation endlessly, though
I take it the reader has a firm enough impression of the complexity of her situation to understand
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just how wrongheaded an appeal to moral theory would be given the circumstances. Now, suppose
for a moment, that we had known from the outset that her ground project had been to make her
parents proud by becoming the first person in her family to graduate with a college degree. Though
far from an open and shut case, for the first time her plight seems a little less opaque—the primacy
of her own ground projects illuminates a way forward when impartial morality could not. In other
words, the rightness or wrongness of the given theory amounts to naught in light of her practical
predicament.
Consequently, the ideals imposed by moral theory are burdensome indeed. In fact, they are
ideals so burdensome, Williams maintains, that it becomes conceivably irrational for us to pain
ourselves to realize it: “There can come a point at which it is quite unreasonable for a man to give
up, in the name of good ordering of the world of moral agents, something which is a condition in of
his having any interest in being around in that world at all.” 36 Here, we can see Williams shifting the
conversation away from pure theory to the way in which people actually behave as social beings in
and of the world.
Thus, the issue that Williams is foregrounding here is another practical concern regarding
human motivation. Despite the litany of far flung thought experiments proposed by moral
philosophers over the past several decades that suggest otherwise, ethics has always been and will
remain a branch of practical philosophy. Given our stated goal of informing the ultimate question,
“How should I live?”, it seems obvious that frequent reflection on how their intellectual endeavors
are touching base with “real concerns that animate our ordinary ethical experience” 37 would be an
ethicist’s top priority. The “arid, ahistorical, second-order” 38 debates that academic philosophy
seems not only to tolerate but to endorse, however, tell a different story that rings like the sound of
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a cracked bell. As Williams himself put it, while “most moral philosophy at most times has been
empty and boring…contemporary moral philosophy has found an original way of being boring,
which is by not discussing moral issues at all.” 39 I can only imagine that Williams had the infamous
Trolley problem 40 (and its ever-proliferating derivatives) in mind when making such a statement.
More to the point, if Williams made a special effort to highlight the practical concern of human
motivation over and above the watertight structures of deontology and consequentialism, we can be
assured that he did so for good reason. Namely, he understood that, at the end of the day, it is the
individual who must sit alone in a room with himself. If he is to maintain his integrity (to use
Williams’ term), then he must recognize the primacy of the ground “projects and attitudes with
which he is most closely identified,” 41 and act accordingly. To do so is to simultaneously move in the
direction of authenticity, for the individual in question is no longer under the spell of the “peculiar
institution” and has begun to think for himself. Fittingly, motivation, particularly personal
motivation, the likes of which energize the ground projects Williams is so fond of, is of vital
importance to a fully fleshed out notion of authenticity. Although he never wrote on authenticity at
length in any direct sense, it comes as no surprise that Williams leaned on it to sum his philosophical
work shortly before his death: “If there’s one theme in all my work it’s about authenticity and selfexpression…. The whole thing has been about spelling out the notion of inner necessity.” 42 It is this
‘inner necessity’ that we shall examine next.
D. Desire
Fortunately, Williams opted to clear away the rubble left in the aftermath of completely
razing the structures of both consequentialism and deontology. Underneath, we find an untouched
earth ripe with potential, upon which we hope to keep clear of artificial debris in order that our
Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), xvii.
See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect for the original problem. See also Judith Thompson,
Francis Kamm, and Peter Unger, among others, for a variety of alternative derivatives.
41 J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 116-117.
42 Stuart Jefferies, “The Quest for Truth,” The Guardian, November 30, 2002. Interview with Bernard Williams.
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ground projects might flourish without the need of new foundations and structures of their own. (In
fact, I can think of nothing more detrimental to the enterprise!) Despite what the name ‘ground
projects’ suggests, however, there seems to exist something more fundamental to our motivation
than even they can convey, a deeper sort of ‘bedrock projects,’ if I may. For to consider a ground
project tacitly raises the further question: how do we determine our ground projects? Is it a
meandering process of discovery, an amor fati à la Nietzsche? A somewhat arbitrary yet entirely selfwilled creative pursuit à la Sartre? Or something else entirely? I think the technique lies most reliably
in the space between the two poles of fate and freedom, in our fundamental experience of desire. At
last, I believe, we tapped into the well’s source from which authenticity springs. Both immediately
recognizable by every human being who has ever lived and yet, by its very nature, concealed from
others’ direct experience, desire occupies a strange phenomenological space. This strangeness,
however, is precisely the characteristic which affords it such privileged status for insight into
ourselves and what we truly are at bottom.
Our desires, then, are a primary sensation to be recognized and attuned to, rather than
consciously willed from out of nothingness or compelled to transform from their opposite (we
cannot, for instance, in an instant, will that we root for the Red Sox over the Yankees any more than
we can will our preference for polyamory to monogamy). They offer us the most direct perception
by which we can begin to understand what “things are in some real sense really you, or express what
you [are] and [what] others aren’t,” to borrow a phrase from Williams. 43 Here, ‘things’ is broadly
understood to signify our fundamental desires, and ‘others’ are the rogue ideologies that slip into our
headspace unannounced and fool us into behaving in ways contrary to our desires. To expand upon
the example touched on above, constant bombardment by social programming may lead us to a
place where we repress our innate desire for multiple partners in favor of the till-death-do-us-part
43
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sermon preached by both mainstream religious and secular dogma. In order to further their own
agenda and cultural biases, these extended family organizations would have us believe that there is
only one proper way to conduct our lives, and they hold the code to decipher it, when, in fact, we
alone are the individuals privileged with this choice. The simplest explanation for desire’s elite status
is the way in which it makes itself known to us: It is felt by us intuitively and cannot be reasoned to
by means of logical analysis alone. It is precisely desire’s position at the bedrock of our awareness
that effectively shields it from a whole host of cognitive biases to which our reasoning is constantly
susceptible, and subsequently acquaints us with the source of what will ultimately lead us to greater
satisfaction: the functioning toward the gratification of our desires. These cognitive biases not only
enable us to convince ourselves of facts that are not true 44 but further serve to rope those same facts
off from further questioning. Writers as diverse as Wittgenstein (“nothing is so difficult as not
deceiving oneself” 45) to science fiction author Robert A. Heinlein (“man is not a rational animal; he
is rationalizing animal” 46) have remarked on man’s Achilles heel: using his own intellect to outsmart
himself, with the most destructive effects of this rationalization occurring when we mistake an
emotive response for a logical one—Jonathan Haidt’s work on moral dumbfounding, a
phenomenon by which people dogmatically insist on a moral judgment which, upon deeper
reflection, they cannot justify, is an excellent example of this. 47 By calling a spade a spade, we are
honest with ourselves about where the source of our motivation actually is rather than where we
would like it to be. In other words, it is only by attempting to understand our deepest impulses,
rather than unconsciously misleading ourselves with unrecognized social programming, that we can
begin to fulfill a deep need for our lives to be meaningful—and, as people everywhere can attest to
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simply by having lived, functioning toward the gratification of desire is nothing if not meaningfully
engaging by its very nature.
Bearing the above in mind a few difficulties still rise to the fore. In our efforts to discern
authentic desires from ideological mirages, we must take care not to become overly reductionist in
our treatment of desire, to the point where the sensation is degraded past what is accurate or
beneficial with respect to authenticity and, in turn, ground projects. Our desires manifest in myriad
ways on a wide array of different levels, but if we can peel back the second- and third-order desires
like the exterior layers of an onion, we create the possibility of coming into true, unitive knowledge
of ourselves and what propels us forward. Given a deep and conscious awareness of ourselves and
our motives, our further investigations will affirm our most surface level desires as fully integral to
each subsequent layer below it, all the way down to the core. More often than not, however, we will
notice how our most particular desires are merely contingent on something more cardinal. For
instance, say that we identify what we take to be an insatiable desire to have children, a desire so
powerful that our lives would be irreparably tainted were we to ignore this most maternal (or
paternal) urge. Now, like I suggested, it may be, upon more careful probing, that this desire truly is
the bottommost level, but such a conclusion hardly suffices for the reality of the situation. 48 Suppose
instead that the desire to have children, for some people, is merely a manifestation of a deeper desire
to live a meaningful life. For simplicity’s sake, I’ll halt the desire fractal here, but even a treatment
this limited is enough to show just how complicated an exercise such as this could become, not to
mention how illuminating. For to unveil a more essential level throws light onto the contingency of
the higher-order desire that was itself just taken as essentially unconditional. In the preceding
parenting scenario, it emerges that raising children is not actually our ground project in the way that

Though the literature on the subject is regrettably sparse, anecdotal evidence abounds with stories of parents who, despite
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from this insufficient data, the fact that such people exist at all is not controversial and prompts further inquiry.
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Williams would define it. 49 Instead, we find ourselves freed up, as it were, to see ourselves in terms
of a multitude of novel ground projects that otherwise would have gone unexamined and dismissed
as not being live options when in truth they always were—it was simply our rationalizing mind
endorsing dogmatism with no checks. The key here then is to discover that desire within us which is
not contingent and build from there. The worry, of course, is that we will never truly achieve
certainty regarding which of our desires is bedrock and which are merely conditional. To the extent
that we are engaged in practical endeavors, absolute certainty will most likely evade us, but again,
this is something of a blessing in disguise. Complete conviction is the hallmark of dogmatic,
ideologically driven thinking, and by opting to question the deeper nature of our so-called desires,
we resurrect the possibility of unmasking them when they are not what they profess themselves to
be, and doubling down on our efforts in a more intelligent manner when they are. Whether such a
move will provide satisfaction in the long term is questionable; what is less controversial, however, is
whether it will imbue his life with a sense of purpose, meaning, and non-arbitrary direction.
Aristotle employs a similar process in his search for the highest Good at which all things
aim: “So if what is done has some end that we want for its own sake…then clearly this will be the
good, indeed the chief good,” 50 where done is functionally equivalent to desired. Our inward quest for
fundamental desires, then, can be helpfully viewed as a repurposing of his original method for
desire’s ends understood broadly rather than eudaimonia. The crucial difference, of course, being that
Aristotle’s project was envisioned as a catch-all solution for man qua man searching for guidance on
how to live the good life, whereas authenticity (and the desire, ground projects and subjective
orientation we have been discussing presently) only makes sense within the context of the individual’s
life. Regardless of whether unique individuals arrive at identical conclusions concerning their desires
(indeed, given our remarkably similar genetic makeup, I suspect, like Aristotle, that convergences
49
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will be more plentiful than our divergences, having shed enough layers), it is the personal process of
discerning them that is vital to the conclusions having any motivational impact on us. More to the
point, regardless of where our investigations lead us, how we choose to go about implementing our
ground projects is arguably of even greater significance. And this is precisely where authenticity
comes into play.
E. The interplay of desire and ground projects
To sum, if fundamental desires are our compass and ground projects our destination, then
authenticity is the mode of transportation we choose to get there. Through this metaphor, desire’s
primacy becomes obvious: not only is it our most effective source of energy in the sense that it starts
the wheels churning, but it orients us in the proper direction as well. One cannot hope to live
authentically or engage in ground projects that don’t stink of arbitrariness without becoming fully in
touch with his most intrinsic desires. This does not, however, imply that authenticity must take a
backseat to desire or, especially, to ground projects. If anything, it puts us back in the driver’s seat,
operating, as we are, with the understanding that authenticity manifests itself as the prevailing attitude
through with which we engage our lives or the all-pervasive thematic element that provides a degree
of integrity to a normally fragmented life. On this account, then, the art of living authentically (for it
is indeed an art and not a science) places much less emphasis on Kierkegaard’s “idea for which I am
willing to live and die,” 51 or a Nietzschean discovery of our ultimate fate by which we can orient
ourselves once and for all. In this light, both Kierkegaard’s ‘idea’ and Nietzsche’s fate are better
understood as ground projects than as authentic living, given the static nature of ground projects that
does not square well with our lived experience of desire and authenticity’s fluidity.
Though precisely articulating our ground projects has its perks, namely that we increase our
likelihood of manifesting them, it has its drawbacks as well: we run the risk of becoming unreceptive
51
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to shifts in source, that is, in the reason why we adopted them in the first place. A characteristic
unreceptivity to shifts in source, or desire, leads us to suffer the misconception that there is nothing
new to discover and that our ground projects are fixed. This misconception stems, in turn, from
further misconceptions that we need to find a singular answer to clear up all of our existential
ponderings for good, have everything figured out beyond a shadow of a doubt before we can
proceed, and generally dominate our lives rather than working with them when such a consolidated
and controlling relationship to our ground projects is simply not necessary. The notion of ‘finding’ a
vocation is a telling example of this unfortunate misperception: As children, we may have hoped to
be firefighters, baseball players, doctors, astronauts. While skill and a lack of resources may have
contributed to the wilting of many of these dreams as we outgrew adolescence, I would argue that
we far more simply outgrew the dream itself, a development universally perceived as exceedingly
ordinary and even healthy as we adjust our ground projects to meet our shifting desires. Given that
“every man is the sum total of his reactions to experience,” as Hunter S. Thompson so eloquently
puts it, it follows that “as [our] experiences differ and multiply, [we] become different [people], and
hence [our] perspective changes.” 52 This sentiment, however, construed as a hallmark of common
wisdom with reference to children, seemingly becomes lost with age as our hubris dictates that we
can and inevitably will someday arrive at a point in time when we solve our life’s ultimate riddle like
a stereogram. 53 The expectation that the average student will graduate college with her life plan
etched in stone is at least implicitly stated at the outset. Yet that same student has an 80 percent
likelihood of changing her major at least once before graduation. 54 Are we to think that the vision for
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the future our typical graduate holds is, in some significant and meaningful sense, any less arbitrary
than the one he envisioned four years prior, or even as a child for that matter? I think not. Far more
likely is that this vision for the future (indeed, any vision for the future) and the ground projects we
hold dear are little more than a snapshot of the present moment, and to treat them as the “X” at the
end of the long and illustrative journey to the proverbial treasure chest is to do our future selves a
grave disservice. This disservice, of course, repeats itself across the whole run of temporal scales
from birth until death.
Given that we are compelled to discard ground projects as our ultimate reference point for
living meaningful lives, are we consequently doomed to grope about unmoored in our perpetual
search for Shangri-La? To end the search on such a hopeless note would be cruel and, more
importantly, unnecessary. As the Buddha said, “If it were not possible, I would not ask you to do
so,” and I intend to follow in the spirit of this imperative. 55 The real trouble with the approach just
explicated, as we have stated, is that the unskillful means of prioritizing ground projects over desire
and authenticity is akin to putting the cart before the horse. For the analytically inclined, the rough
formula of why + how = what may prove illuminating, wherein why is our desire, how is our
authenticity manifesting itself, and what are our ground projects. From this picture, it is crucial to
note that why and how operate symbiotically, and yet both have their own distinct sphere of influence
in our psyche. Why explains, or is the explanation; how evokes. Why gives us the reason; how provides
the method and action. On this model, the why is self-evident, in the sense that although it does the
explaining, it is, at its deepest and most unfiltered levels, unexplainable and unalterable by any
further phenomenon. These first-order desires, which we are called to recognize and understand,
furnish us with all of the intimate knowledge of ourselves that we need in order to move in the
direction toward our highest sense of meaningfulness. The how, however, presents itself much more
55 Paraphrase of the Kusala Sutta in The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Anguttara Nikaya, trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi
(Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2012), 159. The entire Sutta is relevant and worth reading.
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ambiguously, and thus we have a much greater say on shaping the energy or the process it gives
form to. All the reasons in the universe are ultimately hollow if they do not, by their very presence,
compel us to act in accordance with them. Consequently, we want to act in such a way as to proffer
the manifestation of our ground projects that arises from what we uncover about our desires, with
‘act’ here being understood in the broadest sense of the word—indeed, we are ‘acting’ all the time,
even when we scarcely realize it, and just as the processes of our lives are continuous, so too does
the truly authentic individual never rest in the sense that he is constantly triggering the experience of
what he understands as his primary goal beyond that which can be comprehended on a merely
conceptual level. It is not enough to rely solely on rationality—other, more intuitive sources of
knowledge must be explored before the authentic individual can claim to have given the situation a
fair shake.
Bearing that in mind, a somewhat lengthy qualifier must be investigated before proceeding.
Namely, the possibility that desire need not play a central, guiding role in an authentic individual’s
life—for it seems altogether plausible that an individual could, following conscious deliberation on
the source of her motives, settle on demoting desire’s primacy in favor of adopting a Kantian model,
an Aristotelian model, or any other such system of ethics requiring limited input from the user. This
apparent degradation of desire, however, is only skin deep, and turns on an inadvertent conflation of
reason and desire; regardless of the preexisting system endorsed, it seems inconceivable that any
such system in question could be affirmed through a mechanism other than desire. Even if the
supposed appeal of a given system is its correspondence with literal truth, such an affirmation still
depends on the individual desiring and valuing truth in her life. That is, in a world without valueladen givens, even the most innocuous of reason-based decision making is undergirded by a desire
to align one’s life with a correspondence theory of truth. The degree to which this desire is explicitly
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verbalized remains of little consequence, and desire retains its importance, albeit, at times,
unconsciously.
So much for one sort of worry. As for worries of a second sort, on the account we have
been charting, the apprehension of desire seems to notably limit the freedom that the authentic
individual can operate under, since his range of options will be necessarily constrained by that which
he desires, a further fact that he has little say over. Prima facie this seems to undermine the radical
sense of freedom that makes authenticity so attractive in the first place. To adopt this view,
however, would be to fall into the spirit of seriousness Sartre set out to dismantle in Being and
Nothingness. In the technical sense of the term, we are of course in no way obligated to act in
accordance with our desire, or what Sartre would call our facticity: “I find an absolute responsibility
for the fact that my facticity is immediately inapprehensible” in the sense that our facticity “always
appear[s] across a projective reconstruction of my for-itself.” 56 To completely ignore our desires
(which, as we have shown, offer the clearest window into our authentic self), however, would be to
fall prey to a vicious cycle of arbitrariness that appears to undercut the entire void authenticity hopes
to fill by making the entire endeavor devoid of meaning entirely. Charles Taylor reiterates the point
in response to the soft-relativists who he thinks simultaneously represent authenticity’s most visible
and misguided proponents: “I couldn’t just decide that the most significant action is wiggling my toes
in warm mud. Without a special explanation, this is not an intelligible claim.” 57 In the true spirit of
authenticity, we must maintain some semblance of a middle ground if we hope to avoid the
meaninglessness just spoken of. While we are not in a position to create our desires ex nihilo, we are
granted the capability of viewing ourselves as the preeminent interpreters of our own lives, to the
extent that our interpretation is informed, though not caged, by desire. By discovering what is
meaningful and important and to what degree, we reclaim our sense of freedom and rescue our
56
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desires from vagueness and standardization. Furthermore, upon closer inspection the issue of radical
freedom starts to look rather superficial anyway. To use a particularly outrageous example that
nonetheless drives the point home, we are not meaningfully hindered by the fact that we are unable
to reproduce with orangutans any more than we find our wings clipped by this confrontation with
desire, since in both cases the act in question was not something that we were interested in doing in
the first place. On the quest for authenticity, aligning ourselves with our first-order desires is in our
best interest, and to interpret their course as precisely as possible seems fortuitous for us as well, if
we are to have any hope of realizing them. Indeed, what could be more authentic than defining
winning and losing on our own terms by consciously choosing how we live our lives amidst a sea of
conflicting ideas and stimuli?
F. Presence
The real key lies in the notion of being responsive to the here and now, and this requires an
extraordinarily quick and supple mind to respond adeptly to these potential changes. The emphasis
on a quick mind is absolutely essential, especially in the context of desire. Simple observation will
reveal that our desires are constantly shifting in both subtle and overt ways; so, we must be careful
so as not to idolize a particular desire and pursue it blindly, as if it were just another dogma. Given
the frequency with which it transforms, we run the very real risk of chasing something that is no
longer related to our larger project of manifesting authentically if we are not regularly reevaluating
the accuracy of our internal compass. Desire, it seems, is a bit of a mongrel; consequently,
authenticity, understood from moment-to-moment, has no more loyalty to the past than it does to
the unconscious decision making it repudiates. Naturally, I think, we will find that our lives do
contain a continuous narrative thread to reference, but this link is as tenuous as anything else we
have examined.
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As with much of this project, we find a close compatriot in Aristotle. Although Aristotle’s
‘highest good’ might be better viewed through the lens of D.H. Lawrence’s “deepest impulse” in the
context of our project, both men are essentially pointing at the same thing: the alchemical gold
which will color our ultimate search. 58 Whereas Aristotle would call attention to his own emphasis
on habituation, the term practice seems to evoke more clearly that notion of the here and now so vital to
authenticity’s nurturing, as opposed to the degree of mindlessness implied by habit. Even if, for the
sake of argument, we concede that habits are rightfully sought after in certain situations, what is to
be done in the often lengthy intermediary period while we wait for these habits to form? If the
situationist’s critique of virtue ethics has shown us anything, it is that the virtuous are both rare and
far from the only people who are in constant need of ethical guidance. 59 The trouble then is twofold:
First, the virtues are not ours but mankind’s, and second, they are too manifold to be left
undifferentiated. We will take them both in turn.
G. Return to subjectivity
The first trouble is once more motivational—if we have not done anything to begin the
transfer of possession from humanity’s universal stockpile of concepts to that which holds unique
meaning for us in our own moral lexicon, it will do little to aid us during those times which demand
the most of us or when our attention is stretched thin and rendered far less responsive. There are
many reasons why the Bible has proven more popular and effective than the Nicomachean Ethics for
guiding behavior, chief among them being the fact that the former’s Christian adherents have
internalized their Word of God, entered a personal relationship with its teachings, and realized, on
both an emotional and a conceptual level, the power and beauty of the words for their individual
selves. The words are neither foreign nor patronizing; they have familiarized the language to the
Stuart Jefferies, “The Quest for Truth,” The Guardian, November 30, 2002.
For more on the situationist critique of virtue ethics, see John Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” in Nous 32 (1998),
508-530. This is a large issue on which much more can be said, but for our present purposes, I think it does no harm to our discussion
to lay it to one side.
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point where, in some very meaningful sense, they can be said to have written it themselves. This
stands in contrast to Aristotle’s contemporarily secular defenders who have a far weaker personal
connection with the logic aside from an intellectual understanding and endorsement. On paper, the
universality of this doctrine should read as a strength, but in practice it is most certainly a weakness.
Given that practical wisdom Aristotle primarily aspires to, this criticism must be adequately
responded to if we are to rescue part and parcel of his project: “the present inquiry does not aim at
theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not to know what virtue is, but in order to
become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use).” 60 The remedy, I think, is to
explore virtues on our own and tame them, as it were, by linking them with desire so as to grant
them that motivational import. Our list of commonly accepted values is hopelessly long, 61 and
though Aristotle does a nice job of singling out a few that he thinks are of top importance under
which the others may be subsumed (e.g. magnanimity, justice, phronesis), they remain little more than
words until we have internalized them and realized their significance like our Christian has realized
the Word of God. Regardless of whether we come to the same conclusions as Aristotle or any other
ethicist or religious text for that matter, the sheer fact that we arrived at the conclusion ourselves
with eyes wide open makes all the difference— “even by deciding to look, [we] go a long way
toward making the choice” to live authentically. 62
H. Authenticity in society
Frustratingly for contemporary seekers of authenticity, modern is quite well aligned to thwart
our search for the self-awareness and understanding necessary for this authenticity (to say nothing of
desire) to flourish. I am referring to the ubiquitous status of technology that has, at least in the
industrialized West, subsumed us through our consumption of it. Take a moment to ponder: How
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross (Cambridge: Internet Classics Archive, 2009), II, 2 (1103b).
See here for a non-exhaustive list of over 400 values/virtues: http://www.stevepavlina.com/blog/2004/11/list-of-values/.
62 Hunter S. Thompson, “Hunter S. Thompson on Finding Your Purpose,” YFH, May 6, 2014, Accessed February 1, 2017,
https://yourfriendshouse.com/uncategorised/hunter-s-thompson-on-finding-your-purpose/. Emphasis removed.
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many hours a day do we spend in front of a computer screen? A phone screen? An automobile
windscreen? All three screens combined? How much of our life comes at us through a screen,
vicariously? While our personal answer to these questions may revolt us, the truly insidious and
silent implication in all this is not what is coming through these screens at us but what, because of
our near constant exposure to these devices, is being screened from us. If what we consume
electronically is coming at us externally, filling us up from the outside, then it seems to follow that
what is blocked from us is our emotional responsiveness to feelings that are generated from this
inside, including desire. These feelings are, in effect, covered up and overridden by the perpetual
wave of stimulation that leaves our cognitive faculties little processing power to be aware of the
movements of its own content. The non-stop onslaught of symbolic images in both audio and video
form serves only to exacerbate these effects and send our minds into a state of relentless motion in
which emotions and internal sensations become increasingly confused, manipulated, and
subsequently inauthentic. Technology’s depersonalizing effect is not a new one, and its now
omnipresent presence has served only to intensify this effect. 63 Since the literature on the issue is far
too vast to adequately survey within the scope of this paper, we will have to settle for intuitive
arguments that, I think, will hold up to scrutiny upon further, empirical investigation. Irrespective of
this lack of literature, however, the link between our overuse of technology and its detrimental effect
on our ability to relate to our lives authentically seems obvious. With such a heavy influx of external
stimuli, the mind becomes sedated by the barrage of thoughts that arise as a natural consequence of
this consumption pattern. As grandmother used to say, “You are what you eat,” which is to say, you
are what you consume, and this relationship holds true regardless of what enters the body. If we
continually gorge ourselves on even the healthiest of foods (the problem with obesity is as much the
quantity consumed as the quality), our bodies will grow slow, sluggish, and unable to adequately
63
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react to moving external stimuli in our environment. In much the same way, if we continually gorge
ourselves on even the healthiest technology, productivity and self-help articles all included, our
minds will grow slow, sluggish, and unable to adequately react to moving internal stimuli from the
depths of our consciousness. Given the ever-expanding nature of our experience and the requisite
shifts in desire that accompany it, only those rich in self-awareness and poor in distraction will have
met the necessary conditions for detecting this authentic state within themselves.
It is in light of these growing problems that we must shift our attention if we wish to have
any hope of reclaiming the true meaning of authenticity for our individual selves. Though the
personalized nature of authenticity limits us from explicitly spelling out the precise characteristics of
the authentic individual, we may be, as was stated at the outset, able to stake down the corners of a
more general sort, and thereby get a rough sense of where our target lies. We can, at the very least,
be sure that the authentic individual’s primary frame of reference is herself, given that we are most
immediately disclosed to ourselves in a way that others aren’t through our subjective experience of
desire, which offers the content we may construct our lives with. Of course, we are in no way
restricted to a narrower band of action through a clear-sighted recognition of this desire; though
without some acknowledgment of our desires, we will become hopelessly mired in arbitrariness. This
process of relating to our desires and, in turn, our eventual ground projects constitutes the
wholeness of authenticity, vague as it may be. Furthermore, it seems clear from our exploration that
the authentic individual is in a state of constant arriving, the destination impossible to pin down and
thus not the point of our inquiry. Authenticity arises moment-to-moment as the natural response to
man existing in his environment, and can only be understood from the inside. As such, the authentic
individual consciously creates, or should we say interprets, his own way of life as he sees fit. He is
aware of the influence that external pressure has on him, and consciously chooses to relate to that
influence in the way he sees fit, conscious conformity all included.

41

III.

Relation with Ethics
The obscure themes we have tried to delimit amount to this. Having thoroughly illustrated

what authenticity consists in, we will now turn to a discussion of why we ought to care—though, as
should become demonstrably clear as we proceed, we intend to employ the moral ought a tad less
emphatically than do many of our predecessors. Before we begin in earnest, it is worth reminding
that we are not presenting authenticity in direct competition with classic moral theories (e.g.
consequentialism, deontology, etc.). Insofar as a moral theory is charged with the task of providing
some sort of evaluative mechanism to determine what makes an act ethical or unethical, authenticity
invariably falls short. The hope, however, is that we can take this limitation in stride by showing that
authenticity need not aspire to usurp traditional moral theories in order to be of significant interest
to the individual inclined to examine her life more fruitfully. It is in this spirit that we present the
following analysis of the ways in which authenticity converges with and diverges from the larger
ethical tradition.
1. Convergences
Few topics breed such universal interest as ethics. Indeed, for good or ill, nearly every major
figure and certainly every major civilization has had something to say on the question of guiding our
conduct through life’s back roads and freeways. From Hammurabi to the ancient Greeks to the
ethics of the East to the melting pot of competing viewpoints held in the world today, ethical
considerations exist in a long unbroken chain in which each further iteration cannot be understood
without reference to the predominant school of thought that fathered it, as well the inevitable child
it spawned, or soon will. This, too, is more than mere coincidence. Given how high the stakes are
presumed to be—more obviously for religious ethics in which the fate of an eternity, or at least
another life, are to be determined by the conduct in this one, but also for secular ethics in which the
life we are living is the only one available to us, to say nothing of the well-being of future
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generations so many seem to intrinsically care for—it is no wonder that the ‘how’ of our own lives
has occupied a major position, if not the dominant one, in our headspace as long as we have had
language to contemplate it. 64 Regardless of creed or conviction, one thing is certain: Life is
inestimable to the living. Barring the odd exception (which exists in every field of inquiry, regardless
of subject matter), simple observation confirms this fact, nevermind the near inconceivability of a
world in which an individual’s highest concern was something other than how he is living his own
life. Dress it up in social movements and subservience to a higher power, mask it in abject apathy,
conceal it behind the thin veil of altruism—we all return to the same immutable, brute fact. We exist
and therefore must, by definition, do something about it; be something about it.
It is this unequivocal concern for our lives, in the sense that this concern is the factor of our
experience that we are most immediately acquainted with, that drives the universal concern for how
to live it. It transcends any sort of borders we ever have or ever could dream up; regardless of the
answers we are providing, we are all responding to the same basic question. While our personal
concluding points may be located at different places, these locations to be derived experientially and
experimentally, there is no doubt that our starting points of inquiry remain the same. A line from the
Rig Veda comes to mind here: “Truth is One, the sages speak of it by many names.” 65 In much the
same way, the essential, bedrock question is but one; the ethicists ask it in many ways. Whether it be
Aristotle asking how one ought to live, or Kant and Mill questioning which actions are right and
wrong irrespective of the agent performing them, I maintain that they were, at least initially, concerned
with finding answers for how to guide their own conduct—otherwise, they would not have even
begun the search at all. The universal code they hoped to prescribe based on their personal musings
was simply a bonus. In other words, long before we were interested in the universal, we were
64 Of course, it’s no wonder that there exists such widespread disagreement as well, but we have saved that discussion for the
proceeding section.
65 Translation/interpretation by Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), viii.
For the origin in the Rig Veda, see 1.146.46.
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hopelessly enthralled with the particular. For all this noble inquiring about what is good and proper
for humans qua humans, we were (and still are), at best trying to navigate life as well as we can,
offering up whatever morsel of generality we think may be helpful for someone aside from ourselves
along the way, at worst arrogantly assuming that the conclusions we have reached could not possibly
admit of exceptions. For these reasons, the question we pose to begin our inquiry as the most
appropriate and fruitful point of departure because it gets to the root of our concern: How should I
live? Naturally, our ultimate conceptual conclusions are will be determined by experience and
experiment, so although our personal revelations will assuredly not arise simultaneously, we can at
least be sure that our inquiry begins with similar intent.
2. Divergences
Of course, if it were sufficient to discuss common aspirations alone, then there would be no
need to address the subject of authenticity at all. Although we are in some meaningful sense
comparing apples to oranges, it will nevertheless behoove us to speak of the differences, since it is
here that authenticity’s most robust power will present itself. As is custom, a roving eye toward the
audience in question will best serve our purposes of delineating authenticity from its
contemporaries. More specifically, authenticity’s emphasis on particulars in all their manifestations,
from individual people to circumstances quite remote from the universal flavor of the other leading
normative ethical theories. 66 In other words, it is the way in which the questions are posed rather
than the answers the structure provides that set authenticity apart. It is here,
in the subtle shift of Socrates’ original question to, “How should one live?” from, “How should I
live?” that we will find the novelty of authenticity. 67 In many ways, authenticity is not so much a
normative ethical theory as it is a lack thereof, its common features developing organically more
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67 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 4.
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often than any top-heavy attempt at systemization. At its fullest realization, it is a collection of
motivations and goals as vast as the number of people on the planet, the most flexible of
frameworks by which it encapsulates a near 7.5 billion (and counting) unique ways of life within its
purview. It is through the relevant constraint of the individual, manifesting desires as they blossom
into ground projects that authenticity begins to take color and shape.
In an effort to forestall any misunderstanding, a few words on the distinction between
morality and ethics is in order before we proceed to break down the various normative ethical
approaches in relation to one another. The observant reader has probably noticed that our use of the
term morality has been intentionally sparing thus far, while our employment of the term ethics has
been correspondingly abundant. While morality and ethics sometimes tend to occupy a synonymous
linguistic space in philosophy, for our present purposes morality can be more helpfully viewed as a
subset of ethics, wholly inscribed within the latter’s wider circle. More specifically, morality is
immediately concerned with the interpersonal dimension of human relations; ethics makes its
subject human behavior more generally. Thus, although the topic of morality tends to dominate
contemporary discussions (at least among the general population), ethics has historically occupied
the broader space. Morality, co-opted most often by deontological and consequentialist traditions,
has consequently promoted considerations of duty and obligation, regarded as fringe issues under an
ethical lens, to paramount importance. As such, the basic question it attempts to answer is slightly
transfigured: “What actions are right and wrong in particular circumstances?”—as opposed to
Socrates’ question: “How should one live?” Given Socrates’ place in history, it should come as no
surprise that compared to morality, ethics represents a larger, older tradition beginning with the
Greeks rather than the Romans. 68 Thus, it naturally follows that ethics finds the fullest articulation
of its guiding ethos in the virtue ethics tradition. Its emphasis is on the cultivation of our personal
68
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character as opposed to delineating specific courses of action, and as such finds itself as equally at
home in the minutiae of daily life as in its most poignant moments. On the classical distinction
painted herein, authenticity bears far closer kinship to ethics than morality since it aspires to retain
its potential to inform action in the broadest spatiotemporal sense possible. Therefore, our
utilization of both terms is, in each case throughout this paper, intentional for conceptual rather
than literary concerns.
If the issue just raised was purely semantic, then we might not have bothered to raise it at all.
As it stands, however, most classical moral theory’s (i.e. consequentialism and deontology) overcommitment to the morality end of the ethics-morality spectrum leaves a large range of actions with
potential ethical content unaddressed. Namely, any action undertaken that does not have glaring
ethical content (i.e. does not obviously impact the well-being of another) may find moral theory
silent on the issue. This is not so much a criticism as it is an observation. After all, a moral theory
need not be a practical guide to life; it simply must be true. Consequently, to charge
consequentialism, deontology, or even virtue ethics for failing to accomplish what they are not
attempting to do would be resolutely unfair. For our present purpose, then, let us take the following
observations in the spirit for which they are intended; viz., as a demonstration of authenticity’s value
for its commitment to informing a number of fundamental practical concerns that would otherwise
go overlooked. In other words, it should not be necessary to dismantle moral theory wholesale to
demonstrate the normative import of living authentically. Although we could painstakingly dissect
each major moral theory’s relationship with authenticity separately, such a move is neither necessary
nor helpful in our particular circumstances. Instead, it should suffice to take them ‘of a piece,’ and
examine what sets them apart more generally. After all, if a given moral theory comes up short, as it
were, while others can fill in those same gaps, then subsequently proclaiming authenticity as the
panacea to a mirage of a problem would be to caricature moral theory unfairly.
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The most stark and irreconcilable contrast is two-fold: first, traditional moral theories’ use of
binding force to bolster their prescriptions; second, regardless of the tack that is taken, the tack
applies universally without nuance—there is no fine-print opt-out clause at the bottom of the
contract and we sign it compulsively at birth. In Aristotle’s tradition, there is a best way for humans
qua humans to live and this, at its core, admits of no deviance. For Kant and his successors, our
rational will binds us to a predetermined set of permissible and impermissible actions and for Mill
and his adherents the principle of utility is proclaimed like the 11th commandment. Though secular
in nature, these three normative ethical theories share something in common with the world’s major
faith paths: a doctrine of normative truths that does not depend on our preference for its validity.
This one-size-fits all approach to ethical decision making leads to the “mesmeric force” that G.E.M.
Anscombe, among others, believes the moral ought to have accrued over the years. 69 If what is right
and wrong, good and proper, can only be understood through one particular lens, regardless of what
color that lens may be, then there is little room for the notions of desire and ground projects so vital
to authenticity to flourish. As we have shown in the preceding sections, desire and ground projects
are themselves preeminently important because they often furnish us with the very reasons we
choose to go on living at all. While the specific content of these desires and ground projects are
contingent based on our constitution and circumstances, they can still be said to occupy this role in a
more general sense regardless of content. If, like Camus, purports, “There is only one really serious
philosophical problem, and that is suicide,” 70 then it is these considerations, rather than the
universalized unwavering prescriptions of morality, that have the potential to propel us forward out
of despair or apathy. Again, the distinction we have been drawing is not so much normative as it is
descriptive; that is, it is not so much that desire and ground projects ought to motivate our lives more
than an impersonal and universal morality, but rather that they do and this, if anything, appears to be
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the inescapable fact, an observation rooted in lived experience a posteriori as much as it is rendered
plausible a priori. We will explore morality’s insistence on its binding force (a precondition it does
not share with authenticity) in more detail in the following section; but for now, it is sufficient to
illustrate the issue with the paradigmatic case of the passionate, though not particularly talented,
musician. Regardless of the duties and obligations imposed on him by morality (e.g. to his family, or
civil society), he knows that he must go on playing music first and foremost, notwithstanding
commercial success, in order to have any reason to go on at all. The question of suicide presents
itself, implicitly or otherwise, and an authentic framework offers the tools by which he might begin
to make heads or tails of his situation in a way that morality’s standard approach, by its very nature,
cannot.
Consequently, morality’s insistence on impartiality commits itself to a version of motivational
externalism (as opposed to authenticity’s motivational internalism) that struggles to align itself with our
lived experience of the world. Bernard Williams discusses this motivational issue at length, and
ultimately rejects the notion that external reasons alone are sufficient motives for action. In effect,
he argues that, “we cannot have genuine reasons to act that have no connection whatever with
anything we care about,” including morality that appeals solely to our rational faculties. 71 Essentially,
he observes that unless a motive for action arises from “an agent’s subjective motivational set,” 72 or
a set of further motivations that reliably build on what is already extant, then we will have no reason
to act because external reasons alone do not exist. While this may spell trouble for moral systems
more generally (both Aristotle and Kant would notably respond that their ethics are bound up in
further facts about human nature or an agent’s rationality, respectively; i.e., by their very nature, their
moral systems are derived from internal reasons—though for reasons we have yet to explore, there
are serious reasons to doubt the universal binding force these prescriptions subsequently claim),
71
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authenticity as we have depicted it encounters no such difficulties. This is because desire, and, by
extension, ground projects, are the quintessential examples of internal reasons—by their very nature,
they motivate our action in the direction of that which is important to us. In doing so, authenticity
provides a sturdy foundation upon which the individual can construct the remainder of an ethical
life for himself. By intimately linking itself with our “subjective motivational set” and subsequently
admitting of variance, authenticity plugs the practical gaps left in morality’s wake. Thus, if our
overarching practical concern of, “How should I live, in a way that others might not?” contains
anything we care about (which it almost assuredly does; indeed, we likely, though not unequivocally,
care deeply), then authenticity has amply demonstrated its value in a way that contemporary moral
theory does not. Before we go on, however, a discussion of that variance, and the binding force it
repudiates, must be more fully undertaken.
3. Objections
If we cast a backwards glance, we must conclude that an authentic approach can be
adequately described in terms of a few elementary but vital themes around which individuals stake
out meaning for themselves and seek to let their lives serve as the unique expression of their
personal understanding of what matters. Despite the intuitive appeal of this approach, coupled with
the rational foundation we have erected for it in the preceding pages, the overarching way of life
espoused by authenticity has never lacked its fair share of critics due to its supposed tendency to
disregard morality’s binding obligations, as it were, in such a way as to negate whatever practical
import that it may lay claim to. In Against Authenticity, Simon Feldman outlines a two of the most
potent objections. 73 While they are certainly not the ultimate authority or final word on the subject,
they denounce authenticity, directly or indirectly, in several compelling ways that deserve further
attention. Feldman’s ruptures with authenticity are, again, twofold: (1) the moral objection whereby
73
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authenticity leaves space for wicked deeds to be endorsed (“It seems clear…that we can be
conscientiously true to ourselves in the pursuit of what are in fact morally despicable ends.” 74); and
(2) the egoism objection whereby authenticity necessitates too heavy an emphasis on the individual
at the expense of others (“Thinking too much about who we really are and what we really want,
even conscientiously, can lead to paralysis and narcissistic self-involvement.” 75). Let us briefly
examine them both in further detail.
In what we might term ‘the objection from evil,’ Feldman states the essentials of his
position: “Thinking ‘for oneself’ has no special connection with morality, especially if one’s
iconoclasm involves flouting pro-social norms dictating cooperation and respect.” 76 In other words,
thinking for oneself is, at best, value neutral, and we should not let historical strongmen and creative
geniuses off the hook for their reprehensible behavior simply because of their high rating on the
authenticity scale. When authenticity “lead[s] us to harm others in accordance with our ‘true’ and
perhaps vicious or simply amoral selves” it is best to err on the side of conceding our decision
making to those more noble and knowledgeable than ourselves. 77 Far from the antithesis of all that
is admirable in thought, word, and deed, inauthenticity is actually quite estimable when it leads us away
from the harmful influences of poor judgment, poor upbringing, and hubris (as when we choose to
rely on ourselves for its own sake, despite considerable personal ignorance concerning the matter at
hand.) On this account, to live in bad faith is far less deplorable than to live an unabashedly immoral
lifestyle justified by our employment of a Nietzschean tactic by which we assert personal supremacy
as a means of excusing our reprehensible behavior. Counter to authenticity’s methodology, Feldman
effectively asserts that the mere fact that the laws of the universe do not physically prevent us from
engaging in particular acts does not mean that it is morally permissible for us to do so. To assert that
Simon Feldman, Against Authenticity (London: Lexington Books, 2014), 14.
Ibid), 12.
76 Ibid, 13.
77 Ibid, 15.
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analogous relationship would be to make a category error regarding the word can, which is not value
neutral in both cases. 78
In the second case, which we might term, ‘the objection from egoism,’ Feldman further
maintains that authenticity runs counter to our collective well-being by promoting the ends of the
individual at the expense of society taken as a whole. The latter objection’s appeal is even more
natural than that of the first, given the way we have sketched authenticity to this point. Authenticity
is necessarily self-referential, and that insistence on returning to the self as, if not the ultimate source
of knowledge, at least the director of inquiry, causes understandable consternation on the part of
those who believe that such a constant concern for the self comes at the expense of those who
surround us. Cultural historian Christopher Lasch further solidifies authenticity’s link to narcissism,
a psychological disorder characterized by a lack of empathy and self-obsessed behavior, among other
things, claiming that contemporary culture “celebrates” and “justif[ies] self-absorption as
‘authenticity’ and ‘awareness.’” 79 In doing so, authenticity’s greatest strength is turned against itself as
its most crippling weakness. Feldman’s egoistic criticism here is twofold: not only does authenticity
advocate a brand of narcissism that is damaging to those outside the self, it also does not satisfy the
requirements for promoting the well-being of the individual, rendering it a worthless ideal on all
counts. The life of the narcissist, while outwardly shimmering, is often characterized by an inner
bankruptcy fueled by an anxiety to present a particular image—in this case, the image of the
authentic individual. The incessant preoccupation with the self and what it desires paradoxically cuts
us off from genuine and full-fledged satisfaction by searching for a standard that can never be
reached and sanctioning a peculiar brand of ignorance under which appeals to external authority are
rejected on their origin alone, regardless of the detriment to the individual caused in the process.

Or so the old axiomatic wisdom goes: “Just because you can do something doesn’t mean you should.”
Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1991), 218.
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Of course, the core of the egoistic critique is embedded in the unhealthy relationship
between self and other that authenticity endorses. (The cut against authenticity’s ability to provide a
veritable roadmap to satisfaction was always intended as little more than the nail in the coffin.)
Indeed, if an integral assumption of morality’s more traditional roots, one which Feldman aligns
himself with, is that moral prescriptions apply universally and unfalteringly, then it follows that the
fallout from adopting those prescriptions have the potential to effect anyone. Consequently, it
stands to reason that if anyone is set to be impacted by universal morality, then we ought to
promote something conducive to the well-being of the collective over that of the individual. In other
words, there is something deeply troubling about the notion of authenticity, which seems to entail
that subjective feelings and desires can override objectively rational deliberation that serves to
benefit us all. Wary of the license authenticity grants individuals to forsake communal well-being in
the name of all that is personal, Feldman 80 seeks to demystify this inward prosperity by exposing it
as the sacred cow that it is. 81 He says, “there surely seem to be some things that are more important
than our own well-being—if we care about being good…, then sometimes we will inevitably have to
sacrifice our own well-being and perhaps even threaten to do things that alienate us from our
deepest selves.” 82 Accordingly, authenticity is recalled back to the earlier, universalist chimes of
Aristotle, Kant, and Mill among countless others who essentially asserted, “The best life (full stop)
cannot reliably be expected to be the best life for us.” 83 In essence, authenticity works as a massive
intellectual justification of egoism in which the desires of the individual are exalted simply because
they come from within. Rather than comply with this amoral maneuver, this stunt’s true colors need
to be revealed: it is a dangerous enticement aimed at promoting antisocial behavior that ultimately
disadvantages society viewed collectively. There is simply no reason to assume that the innate whims
80 Again, Feldman is no final or comprehensive authority on the issue, but instead serves here as a chosen mouthpiece for a line of
criticism against authenticity that runs in this same vein.
81 And, as Mark Twain was fond of saying, “Sacred cows make the best hamburgers.”
82 Simon Feldman, Against Authenticity (London: Lexington Books, 2014), 12.
83 Ibid.
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of certain individuals should count for more in the final calculation than the universal obligations we
share to uphold the general happiness of one another. We flourish best as a species when we do
right by our neighbors and future generations regardless of the immediate impact (for good or ill)
that orientation has on our ability to realize our desires. Given that the undue weight that personal
considerations are granted under the guise of authenticity, situating such universal concerns firmly in
our blind spot, it should be removed as a possible goal of human existence both generally and in
particular cases.
A. The metaethicist’s dilemma
There are several ways we might hope to respond to Feldman, who has to this point
furnished us with a bevy of objections that attempt to discredit authenticity from multiple angles.
Given Feldman’s presumptuous residency within the moral realists’ framework, perhaps the most
fruitful line of argumentation would be to demonstrate how Feldman’s objections depend on a
question-begging appeal to moral standards that lack the authority he claims for them. The objection
from evil, the egoism objection, and all of the rest that flows from them help their cause by resting
on an implicit assumption regarding morality that must be assessed further. While the moral realist’s
method has its dangers and its advantages, nothing better restores authenticity’s practical potential
than abandoning this pretense of binding force in favor of a more honest, though less popular
skeptical foundation. With moral realism at its back, Feldman’s objections become ingenious in their
own way. Thus, in defense of authenticity, it is necessary to remove the presumption of guilt from
that which is socially frowned upon, to own its primary appeal as evocation rather than obligation,
and to reclaim metaethics for itself accordingly. Having sufficiently and willingly fielded objections
in the court of moral realism, however, we must now step back and address the metaethical
foundation on which they rest and the problems that attend it.
About anarchism, Noam Chomsky expressed,
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Anarchism, in my view, is an expression of the idea that burden of proof is always on those who argue
that authority and domination are necessary. They have to demonstrate, with powerful argument, that that
conclusion is correct. If they cannot, then the institutions they defend should be considered illegitimate.
How one should react to illegitimate authority depends on circumstances and conditions: there are no
formulas. 84

Bertrand Russell made remarks within the same vein concerning atheism:
If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an
elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the
teapot is too small to be revealed by even our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that,
since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is an intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to
doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot
were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of
children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle
the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier
time. 85

Both, of course, are remarking in their own way on the strange corner the philosophical burden of
proof has been backed into regarding the existence of power structures—Government in
Chomsky’s case and God in Russell’s. Through an analogy designed to find common ground in our
rational faculties, Russell demonstrates the absurdity of asserting that the burden of proof lies with
those who would dare to question the existence of a floating teapot orbiting the Sun in space—and
then proceeds to carry the analogy to its logical conclusion, showing that this is exactly what
Christians have done for millennia regarding God! In a much soberer fashion, Chomsky makes a
comparable move, contending that governments are not legitimate by their very existence, but must
be forced to provide evidence that their impact on the lives of those whom they govern is, on the
whole, for better and not for worse. There is nothing inherent in the nature of God or government
that lifts them above the fray, as it were, and grants them immunity from complying with this basic
standard of proof. Far from being privileged by nature, political and religious power structures have
managed to creep into the public consciousness and exert their stronghold through a discreetly
Noam Chomsky, interview by Tom Lane, ZNet, December 23, 1996.
Bertrand Russell, “Is There a God? [1952],” The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 11: Last Philosophical Testament, 1947-68,
(London: Routledge, 1997), 547-8.
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constructed strategy of fear mongering and indoctrination. After all, these organizations are not so
foreign, really; they were organized by men to create power and are sustained by men to maintain
power. Why should we have any recourse to believe that the collective will think and behave any
differently than the average of the individuals who constitute it? As a mere conglomeration of
people and not their hierarchical superior, the claims of these institutions must be subjected to the
same rigorous standard of proof that we subject murder suspects to if we wish to put the real
meaning behind our “of the people, by the people, for the people” mantra back into society. 86
Considering the far vaster danger (and benefit) these institutions can implement, operating under a
guise of default legitimacy will no longer suffice, nor has it ever.
Morality can be helpfully viewed as a corollary to these twin power structures of church and
state, serving as the code of acceptable behavior by which they attempt to modify and control
behavior, this being the 10 commandments (or 5 precepts, Yamas/Niyamas, etc.) and legal codes
respectively, although its purview often extends culturally beyond what is explicitly recorded in these
doctrines, and it is employed just as readily by atheists and anarchists as by Christians and capitalists.
For our present purposes, we can consider morality not only as a corollary but a cousin to church
and state. Attitudes concerning all three in the public consciousness are remarkably similar—their
legitimacy and power to exercise behavior modification is often tacitly accepted out of hand instead
of reasoned to by means of logical proof. Like their rogue cousins, the default position is that the
system of morality exists and ought to be obeyed, leaving those who oppose the critically
unexamined foundations of this system to prove their non-existence, which, as we know, is
impossible, for as mere humans we possess neither the omnipotence nor the omnipresence required
to conclusively show that morality does not and could not ever exist.
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Given what we know about morality, we want to be careful not to overstate the analogous
nature of the relationship between morality and church and state. If their similarity lies within the
proclaimed ubiquitous authority, then their difference lies in the resources at their disposal to
enforce that authority. Just as a given legal code applies to all of that country’s citizenry regardless of
whether they deem the dominant political authority to be legitimate, and just as a given religious
code putatively applies to the whole world over irrespective of the faith they do or do not adhere to,
so too does a given moral code presume to apply universally without regard to personal preference
or desire. As with church and state, the truth of morality is deemed something to be discovered, not
created. Whereas the state has recourse to jail those who break the law and God can banish
nonbelievers and sinners to Hell after death for their behavior in this life (or another karmic trip
around the wheel of samsara, etc.), morality in and of itself has no such powers 87—hence its historic
affiliation with both of the former groups who have, often unconsciously, aided in furthering its
ends where it could get no further alone. 88 Philosophically, this is a particularly salient point because
morality has largely tried to detach itself from these cultural institutions and has instead preferred to
operate on a primarily secular and academic basis since the Renaissance. Despite a heavy degree of
infighting in the intervening years that shows no signs of letting up, morality as an institution has
gained esteem from many opponents of church and state precisely because it tries to transcend
religious and national borders to uncover that which binds us together as humans, on a corporeal
rather than a supernatural or conceptual level. 89

87 Of course, one could argue that the criminal always stands the chance of evading ‘justice’ and the ‘sinner’ likewise may not be
subjected to God’s wrath (or additional rebirths, etc.) if he is right in thinking that He never existed at all, thereby diluting the
authorities’ ability to make good on their threats of punishment. While this is undoubtedly true, I do not think it dilutes our point: on
the assumption that the authority in question can lay down a code at all, it necessarily follows that it has the power to then enforce it.
88 Though there is not space here to cover this subject in depth, this is one of the primary arguments Nietzsche makes in the first
treatise of his Genealogy of Morals.
89 Several modern scholars favor a revised interpretation of religion’s etymological origins. Stemming from the Latin ligare, meaning “to
bind or connect,” religion is then “that which binds us together.” Thus, morality as a school of the modern philosophical tradition can
be helpfully understood as a continuation of this project on more secular grounds. See: Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth, with Bill
Moyers, ed. Betty Sue Flowers (New York: Anchor Books, 1991).
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Historically, this binding agent has been sought for in any number of human facets that we
collectively share. Plato attempted to ground morality in our ability to reason, Aristotle tried to
ground it in what we can observe about human nature, and Thomas Aquinas endeavored to show
that it is self-evident to anyone who might care to look. Nearly all subsequent Western moral theory
flows from here. One thread is common: morality is discoverable, and by association applicable, to
every human being by virtue of our being human and not for any other reason. Naturally, disputes
abound over what precisely constitutes this knowledge, but this is more or less beside our point—
the turn toward authenticity is in the source of the knowledge (i.e. that which lies within us as
opposed to that which lies without us) rather than the content of that knowledge.
Bearing the above in mind, we must be careful not to miss the forest for the trees. Our
present inquiry is not so much concerned with locating the proper source of morality’s headstream,
but in explicating the nature of such sources in a broader sense. Given the unwieldy nature of the
justification of morality more generally, we can say that the particular features of each moral theory
are irrelevant to our discussion, since we are only concerned with the nature of morality’s authority
in the wake of its split with law and religion. This is, of course, not a declaration that morality no
longer overlaps with church and state (indeed, it often does) but alternatively a pointed assessment
of a peculiar brand of secular morality that has attempted to distance itself from justification using
these external standards. 90 Comprising nearly the whole of contemporary academic philosophy,
morality as such has profited mightily from relocating its source away from the arbitrary (the laws)
and the unprovable (God/the supernatural) toward something inoffensive and recognizable by all—
or, at least that is the hope.
In the time since morality ceased to lean on church and state as a valid foundation, it has
been an open folly to assume that the legitimacy it gained in the eyes of many skeptics has not been
90 As evidenced by the fact that, “Because God declared it so,” or, “Because it’s illegal” hardly suffice as justification for a moral
proposition in philosophical circles. (Chappell 2015)
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counteracted with a loss of equal, if not greater magnitude. Naturally, the loss comes at the hands of
the very reason why it attached to the twin traditions of power in the first place. If religion lays claim
to God’s omnipotence, and the state relies on our increasingly militarized police force, then aside
from value neutral social norms, morality is left with a singular word with which to enforce a
behavioral code that, in all its innumerable iterations, runs at least as deep and broad as church and
state: ought. We ought to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which [we] can at the same
time will that it become a universal law,” says Kant. 91 We ought to “act…in proportion as [our
actions] tend to promote happiness,” and we ought not to act “as [our actions] tend to produce the
reverse of happiness,” proclaims Mill. 92 Regardless of how right and noble these formulations
sound, the truth is that morality’s self-alienation from the institutions of power transforms the
structure of its authority from the three-branched system explicit in the state and implicit in the
church to a two (or one, contingent on interpretation) branch system exemplified by morality—
namely, the judicial. 93 In an apocryphal statement, Andrew Jackson purportedly said the following in
response to Chief Justice John Marshall’s ruling: “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it!” 94 Might we venture to say the same of morality? The moralists have made their decision; now let
them enforce it! The only difference between the two claims, as I see it, is that America’s longstanding
respect for rule of law forecasted Jackson’s eventual concession to Marshall, whereas morality has
no such recourse to defend itself. The upshot of all this is not so much that morality has no
enforcement mechanism, but rather the lack of an enforcement mechanism entails that morality’s
binding force is illusory. Without binding force, the moral ought is rendered meaningless (at least in
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. & ed. Allen W. Wood, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 37.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 10.
93 The three branches of government, as we all remember from grade eight civics class, consists in a legislative function that makes the
laws, an executive that enforces the laws, and a judicial function that interprets the laws. Both religion (and morality, for that matter)
would likely protest that they do not create the laws ex nihilo but uncover them instead. Although certainly interesting, the discrepancy
is irrelevant for our discussion.
94 The source material likely comes from a letter to John Coffee, in which he said, “The decision of the Supreme Court has fallen
stillborn and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield its mandate.” See: Paul F. Boller Jr., They Never Said It: A Book of Fake
Quotes, Misquotes, and Misleading Attributions, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 53.
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the categorical sense) since we are entitled to opt out, as it were, of the moral system with no mindindependent repercussions whatsoever. This conclusion, of course, applies to Feldman’s criticisms as
well—the normative ought implicitly endorsed in his critique of authenticity (i.e., ‘we ought not to
make authenticity a first priority’) is essentially empty under the revised descriptive understanding of
morality we have etched.
The idea we are presenting here is not a new one. With her seminal 1958 article, G. E. M.
Anscombe is credited with reviving scholarly interest in a virtue-ethics tradition that had been largely
relegated to the margins of academic discussion since at least the Middle Ages. She too endeavored
to show that both consequentialist and deontological schools improperly abused the moral ought to
their own detriment; such use had long since been rendered incoherent by the shift from
supernatural to natural underpinnings. Without a higher authority from which to derive its power,
she claims, morality’s absolute prescriptions lose their supposed binding force and subsequently
become devoid of meaning altogether. Consequently, she writes, “It would be most reasonable to
drop [the moral ought.] It has no sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are not going to
maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics without it, as shown by the example of
Aristotle.” 95 To keep the moral ought in spite of this revelation, she adds, would be akin to keeping
“the notion ‘criminal’…when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten.” 96
Despite the powerful psychological effect that might linger around the term ‘criminal’ in our
hypothetical scenario (or the moral ought in our present situation), the concept itself would not refer
to anything real at all. The success or failure of Aristotle’s project is not bound up with ours, for he
too does not employ the moral ought to bolster his propositions—regardless of whether his account
(or anyone else’s, for that matter) of the good life is accurate, however, it can register in the minds of
men as sound reasoning and advice at best, since the dismantling of the moral ought signals the end
95
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of its power to impose demands on our will based on argument or rhetoric alone. Rather than rely
on antiquated measures of behavior control, moralists sympathetic to these approaches must either
alter their strategy to reflect this inherent inability to enforce moral codes or revert to backing by the
church to make use of the legalistic concepts of ought and obligation. Given Western philosophy’s
recent aversion to all things supernatural, the latter seems unlikely. 97
Of course, Anscombe was hardly the first to profess the notion that morality’s binding force
has become an illusion since it rejected the aid of a legitimate external authority to enforce it. In
1840, Schopenhauer attempted to skewer Kantian ethics by demonstrating, among other things, that
its focal point, the categorical imperative, is ultimately vacuous. Like Anscombe, he charges Kant
with inadvertently borrowing his moral structure from theology, and granting it powers it can no
longer reasonably claim given its newfound secular foundation. Hence, Schopenhauer reassesses and
ultimately rejects the moral ought that undergirds the categorical imperative.
Every obligation derives all sense and meaning simply and solely from its relation to threatened
punishment or promised reward. Hence, long before Kant was thought of, Locke says: “For since it
would be utterly in vain, to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some
enforcement of good and evil to determine his will; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also
some reward or punishment annexed to that law.” What ought to be done is therefore necessarily
conditioned by punishment or reward; consequently, to use Kant’s language, it is essentially and inevitably
hypothetical, and never, as he maintains, categorical. If we think away these conditions, the conception of
obligation becomes void of sense; hence absolute obligation is most certainly a contradicto in adjecto. 98

Philippa Foot arrives at a similar conclusion: if we wish to rescue moral philosophy from
incoherence in light of the moral ought’s fall from infallibility, then we ought to call a spade a spade
and relabel categorical imperatives to reflect their true nature as mere hypothetical imperatives. By
demanding strict adherence, moralists “are relying on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral ought a

97 For the record, Anscombe herself was doubtful of philosophy’s ability to formulate the bulletproof account of human flourishing
needed for virtue ethics to see its project through. Her strong Catholic inclinations seem to support an alternative reading of MMP in
which she endorses not a return to virtue ethics, but divine command theory.
98 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, trans. Arthur Brodrick Bullock, (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1903),
32-33.
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magic force” 99 when it possesses no such capabilities. The reward and punishment incentives built
into theocracy and government provide us with the practical motivation required to activate our desire
in the direction that the institution in question so wishes. Without this motivational appeal, there is
simply no argument they can make to the amoralist that would oblige him to obey the so-called rules
created, interpreted, and enforced on its basis alone. Stripped of its binding force, morality exposes
itself as just another form of ideology, hampered by a descriptive character that precludes claims to
strict normativity. Far from the only game in town, a given moral system is forced to compete in the
free market place of ideas and appeal to our motivational structures rather than question begging if it
wishes to gain traction.
This is not to say that some moral theories (and, by extension, some ideologies) are not
grounded in further facts about what we think we know about the world, particularly human nature,
and some more so than others. Certainly, a correspondence to observable truth may go a long way
toward attracting followers to a given cause, but the degree to which a given moral theory is able to
turn skeptics into believers does not, in and of itself, furnish it with any more legitimacy than if it
were able to boast only a modest following. While a large following often does inadvertently equip a
moral code with some degree of legitimacy through an ability to wield social approval and
disapproval mechanisms to its advantage—which is, after all, simply a more nuanced manifestation
of the enforcement principle typically available to church and state—a large following neither
guarantees that the movement in question will be ‘moral’ in the traditional sense (Hitler’s Nazism is
an excellent example), nor does it register particularly powerfully with those residing on the moral
margins. No, the specific content of a moral code can have no bearing on our ability to wriggle free
from it given the nature of moral codes themselves, which is inherently to lack a control mechanism
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suitable to enforce it. If morality is to reclaim the influence it has lost at the hands of this devastating
criticism, it will assuredly come by means of voluntary service rather than forced labor.
At the onset of Prohibition, Albert Einstein remarked on his first impression of America:
The prestige of government has undoubtedly been lowered considerably by the prohibition law. For
nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and the law of the land than passing laws
which cannot be enforced. It is an open secret that the dangerous increase in crime in this country is
closely connected to this.100

Replace the government-laden terminology for its moral equivalent and we have the whole of the
problem laid before us: ‘The prestige of morality has undoubtedly been lowered considerably by the
categorical imperatives. For nothing is more destructive of respect for morality and the moral law of the
land than passing prescriptions which cannot be enforced. It is an open secret that the dangerous
crime in immorality is this world is closely connected to this.’ If our most recent election has revealed
anything, it is that attempting to shame people into submission to politically correct culture by
touting its moral superiority and the associated obligation to think and act accordingly does not
work, precisely because the patronized group wised up enough to realize that morality has an optout clause that renders it sterile in the minds of those who will it so. Rather than piling on yet
another system of morality to an already overloaded field of potentialities, we have opted to eschew
this method in favor of something more relatable to our ordinary experience of moral obligation,
namely that it remains nonbinding. It is precisely by avoiding the language of obligation that
authenticity hopes to reclaim some of the legitimacy falsely claimed by its predecessors. 101 The best
we can aspire to do is demonstrate authenticity’s unique appeal using the limited tools we have
available to us—the rest, fittingly, is left up to the reader. But the loss of moral realism’s
authoritative power is felt equally across all arguments, including the objections Feldman has
subjected authenticity to thus far. While the moral skepticism outlined here certainly cannot close
100
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the door alone, it does make the case that authenticity cannot be reasoned against merely because of
the ‘immorality’ it permits. Indeed, a given moral proposition’s complete ineptitude at enforcing
itself coupled with the burden of proof to establish an act’s morality or immorality that rests solely
with the accuser, entails that any such proof will inherently be circular. Furthermore, as I hope we
have shown, without the ability to enforce its own account of right and wrong, morality and all the
moral oughts that follow from it are altered so radically that they necessarily cannot be said to express
objective truth at all. As in the case of Prohibition, if morality cannot enforce the imperatives it
expounds, then why should anyone bother to listen? Where is the motivation? No, if authenticity is
to be detracted from in any meaningfully significant way, another line of thought must be employed.
B. The mythic objection
The combination of the pessimists’ views on human nature, coupled with the moralists’
views on the nature of secular moral judgments, which they failed to realize would be both
guillotined by the is-ought gap and their inability to enforce themselves, constituted the main
objections to authenticity. Bathed in the light of the distinctions we have just highlighted, however,
these criticisms become non-issues.
Still, the moral objections to authenticity do not comprise the whole of the issues. Even if it is
true that both the objection from evil and the egoism objection can be alleviated by the further
metaethics we have delineated, difficulties nevertheless remain. More specifically, we must reconcile
authenticity’s insistence on self-discovery and the willful creation of the self ex nihilo, which seems to
violate the law of conservation of energy, 102 with our understanding of how we are, to a large extent,
products of our environment incapable of such independent feats of will except by self-delusion.
Over 2500 years ago, Gautama Buddha saw the difficulty of the ‘self,’ conditioned by innumerable,
impermanent influences in the world, defining itself as separate from that world in such a way as to
102
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constitute a real, unitary and enduring self. 103 Much later, David Hume would echo those sentiments,
writing that what we conceive of the self is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and
movement.” 104 Though both thinkers were concerned not with authenticity, a term they predated,
their philosophy has been co-opted to varying degrees by further thinkers in a number of ways that,
although often contradicting one another, still strike at supposed misunderstandings of authenticity.
Nietzsche preaches against self-creation in favor of self-discovery; 105 Foucault argues against selfdiscovery in favor of self-creation; 106 Adorno denounces the entire “liturgy of inwardness” as clever
sophistry for replacing one set of ideologies with another—the ethic of authenticity becomes what it
set out to deconstruct. 107 Although each of these criticisms is directed at a particular aspect of
authenticity, and sometimes directed even more finely at a particular author’s conception of it, each
is touching the same chord. Regardless of authenticity’s moral strengths and shortcomings, they
contend, the notion doesn’t add up metaphysically, considering what we can surmise about the self
and its relation to the world.
Put otherwise, these critics have made it necessary for us to delve deeper into the
relationship between the individual and the world, between creation and imitation, to clarify the
metaphysics of authenticity if we wish to ensure that it is more than a mirage and indeed worth
pursuing. Although our prior discussion of metaethics may seem to have implied that authenticity
can function as a viable option with or without a coherent metaphysical backing, this is true only
insofar as secular morality cannot obligate particular modes of living by assuming the truth of those
103 Gautama Buddha, The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Digha Nikaya, trans. Maurice Walshe, (Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 1995), 226-8.
104 David Hume, A Treatsie on Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), 134.
105 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo and The Antichrist, trans. Thomas Wayne, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2004), 39.
106 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1983), 237.
107 Theador Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski & Frederic Will, (Evanston, Northwestern University Press,
1973), 70. Adorno’s criticisms are leveled primarily at Heidegger’s attempt to systematize authenticity, but this polemic’s general
appeal is not without warrant.
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morals from the outset. It is not our intention, nor does it seem particularly tempting, to pursue a
course of action that has no correspondence with literal fact regardless of our ability to do so, any
more than it seems desirous to chase that desert mirage when we already know it to contain no
water. To do so would be to ask more of our collective faculties, rational and otherwise, than is
necessary or possible given our explicit goal of remaining practical above all else. Thus, our effort of
reconciliation will be to explore and contextualize the relationship between two opposing poles of
self-as-illusion and self-as-end-in-itself to discover, if we can, that the dichotomy we have set up
here is a false one. In some certain meaningful sense, to contextualize is to make practical, and to
explore is to envision ways that seemingly disparate ideas can coalesce creatively rather than
fancifully. As we originally conceived of it, authenticity, under the guidance of desires and ground
projects, in response to a social world which often makes demands on the individual that cannot be
accommodated without giving up our entire motivation for living in the first place, has arrived at the
point at which it must either come to terms with a view, not to be taken lightly, that holds the
individual to be an inseparable feature of her environment rather than distinct from it. Understood
as an aspect of this unified whole, to speak of the raw material, so to speak, that the individual uses
to construct an authentic response to a lived situation as originating solely or even primarily from
within the self begins to reek of absurdity. Only by articulating a coherent relationship with
community can authenticity earn its final endorsement.
Obviously, here is not the place to barrel headlong into a meticulous discussion of the nature
of the self, but we may graze the surface by drawing two categorical distinctions on which it turns:
permanence and separateness. In the traditional sense that both the Buddha and Hume rail against, these
are the two characteristics that make up the object of their disbelief: the idea of a self that is both
permanent (i.e. essential and enduring) and separate (i.e. distinct from both its environment and
other beings) is an illusion. From these two characteristics, we can deduce a third derivative, namely
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that of possessiveness—having established ourselves as distinct from others and permanent, we
typically envision ourselves as owning that unchanging essence and all the particulars that manifest as
myriad expressions of it in ways that others cannot. Presenting the Buddha’s and Hume’s
counterarguments to the more conventional understanding of self outlined above is not necessary
for our task at hand, because our response intends to go through their conceptions, not around them.
Furthermore, their subsequent refutation will be equally unnecessary given our intention to
demonstrate authenticity’s flexibility to operate within either schema. In other words, if the
reductionists are mistaken, then the traditional notion of self stands and can provide a sturdy
foundation on which to ground the possibility of authenticity. On the contrary, if their perceptions
are correct, then our hope is to explore ways in which authenticity can thrive given a worldview
where these further facts hold true and bear some significance on our lives. Prima facie, it appears that
all three characteristics are necessary prerequisites for a meaningful conception of authenticity to
take form. Put negatively, if the self is impermanent, then there can be no fixed subject for the
authentic individual to turn inward toward as a source of self-knowledge upon which authentic
responses can bloom. If the self is fluid with the world (i.e. can be understood only as an aspect of
the world with no possibility of a distinct existence) then the individual may not be able to offer
anything more than superficially personal, since the subjectivity it sprang from is merely a myth. And
if the self belongs to the world, then it cannot own the desires which bear fruit in the form of the
thoughts and actions that supposedly constitute the authentic individual. Without some degree of
separateness by which the authentic individual can manifest something essential within himself, the
quest for authenticity seems rather like setting out on the road for Valhalla. Of course, these three
aspects of the self as they relate to authenticity are more closely intertwined than this categorization
entails; so in the interest of covering all of our bases, we will consider them each in turn.
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Fortunately, this was the task, at least in an off-center and limited capacity, of Foucault in
reaction to his concerns about the lack of a fixed, underlying substance from which we are to glean
self-knowledge to translate into authentic action. Given that our environment and the influences it
exerts on everything from our desires to our breakfast food is entirely contingent, Foucault argues,
there remains nothing for us to discover and everything to create, beginning now. He writes, “From the
idea that the self is not given to us, I think there is only one practical consequence: we have to create
ourselves as a work of art.” 108 The presence of something permanent that we can rely on as an
ultimate subjective reference point is not necessary because the authentic individual must create
himself moment-to-moment as circumstances evolve and take on new forms. Although this
conception puts us at odds with Nietzsche’s amor fati 109 and Kierkegaard’s idea for which we can live
and die, and even with Sartre’s insistence on returning to that which is truly us, I think it accords
with the conception of authenticity we have been advocating to this point, espoused explicitly by H.
S. T. Just as the painter does not need to have a fixed image in mind before putting brush to canvas,
so too does the authentic artist make things up on the fly, as it were, noting shifts in internal
experience as they arise, adjusting accordingly. Oriented as the artist, we can attend to the practical
reality of our lived experience in which a fixed self is often not presented to us with rigorous clarity.
Rather than turning our backs on ourselves, so to say, the authentic individual can take this
uncertainty in stride by exercising full creative license to transmute it into something intentionally
personal. Viewed thusly, the non-existence of the permanent underlying self poses no threat to the

108 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1983), 237.
109 To be fair, Nietzsche’s own perspective is rather muddled. Although his remarks on fate in Ecce Homo seem to imply he endorses
more of the discovery model, his remarks in §270 of The Gay Science seem to echo Foucault: “One thing is needful—to give style to
one’s character…through long practice and daily work at it.” Most persuasively, his thought contains elements of both: the lover of
fate must be able to creatively respond to and affirm the myriad facts and situations of his life, and yet also perceive these same
situations as externally gifted. In any case, he can viewed as both a proponent and an opponent of the sort of orientation Foucault is
proposing—his work cannot be definitively couched at either pole.
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possibility of authenticity because accordance with the pop-psychology notion of ‘being true to
yourself’ is not necessary for living authentically.
It is at this point, however, that Foucault’s work on the matter comes to an end and
problems remain to be fully resolved. Namely, even if we do view ourselves as creators and sidestep
the permanence issue, the separateness issue and the possessiveness issue still follow close behind,
walking hand in hand. For the question remains: How can the authentic individual lay claim to his
thoughts and actions if the distinction made between self and other or self and environment is just a
social construct precipitated by a need to make sense of the world and the vantage point it is
observed from? Along these lines, Daniel Dennett likens the self to a center of gravity—a “theorist’s
fiction” that exists only as a concept in the abstract, with no material substance to point to. 110 We
have already dispelled the need for that substance to be permanent, but what of its existence
altogether? If the co-called self is not distinct from the so-called environment, then it will be as
Dennett claims: an illusion we take advantage of in order to situate ourselves within a larger context,
but ultimately empty. Under this conception, for instance, a desire to become a world class soccer
star was born from parents who signed the child up for youth league when he was too young to
choose or understand what he was getting into, much less how it would affect his career aspirations
for decades to come. The young girl who wishes to become a concert pianist was graced by her
father playing the grand piano in the house every evening, and subsequently took up the instrument
herself, fancying it after her father. Foucault, in an interview toward the end of his life, remarked on
his career as a philosopher:
I wasn't always smart, I was actually very stupid in school ... [T]here was a boy who was very attractive
who was even stupider than I was. And in order to ingratiate myself with this boy who was very beautiful,
I began to do his homework for him—and that's how I became smart, I had to do all this work to just

Daniel Dennett, “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity,” in Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, ed. F. Kessel, P. Cole, D.
Johnson (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1992).
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keep ahead of him a little bit, in order to help him. In a sense, all the rest of my life I've been trying to do
intellectual things that would attract beautiful boys. 111

In essence, the classic ‘the chicken or the egg’ dilemma reveals itself here. What came first: the
authentic desire to become an intellectual, or the contingent, unchosen experience of wanting to
impress a young boy? While Foucault clearly professes the latter, I think he would follow that
question up with another: Does it matter? Perhaps many of our most intimate desires ultimately
sprang from things we have had no say in. Perhaps the ground projects we subsequently articulate
belong to our environment more than they belong to ourselves because we cannot trace their causal
origins back to the consciously articulated seat of self. Perhaps the most treasured aspects of our
personality and the values we espouse are in fact more representative of the world we find
ourselves situated in than the person we profess to be. And so on until we arrive at a discussion of
moral luck. 112 If all that we are is determined by external circumstance and constitution, how can
the possibility of authenticity ever emerge?
Although a Sartrean conception of authenticity may have difficulty responding to the
difficulties expressed above, I think, rather fittingly, that they can be sufficiently addressed using the
conception of authenticity we have espoused to this point in this paper. Specifically, I would like to
refer to our discussion of creation and interpretation. 113 The burden of creating both our choices and
our responses to them in a world where comprehensive input regarding the content of those
projects is impossible can be negated by redefining our role to encompass only the translation and
organization of signals into meaningful bits of information. What this definition loses in sex appeal,
it makes up for in practical applicability. 114 Given that our interpretive ability is only as precise as
our definition of what is meaningful (i.e. what we value) and the degree to which we are aware of

James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1993), 56.
See: Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Nagel1.pdf, 2
113 See page 37.
114 As J. R. R. Tolkien said, “All that is gold does not glitter.”
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our assumptions, we have kept what is essential to maintaining a working understanding of
authenticity while reframing the more troubling aspects. Thus, willful self-creation is neither
necessary nor useful in the pursuit of authenticity—all we have to do is to consciously decide what
to do with the experiences that have been granted to us in this moment. Given that we are, to a
certain degree, necessarily molded by environmental pressures, the goal is not so much to free
ourselves from their influence as it is to become aware of their presence, so that we might choose
how to proceed accordingly. Notably, this requires no sense of an enduring, separate self that is
uniquely mine in order to prove meaningful. Our most deep seated desires, our values, our ground
projects all stem from a set of contingent facts about our existence that are not devastating in our
quest to live more fully authentically because they suffice as they are when attempting to make
sense of our lives within a larger framework. The constant self-awareness implicit in such an
approach offers us the best defense to ensuring that our self-interpretations do not become an
unwitting exercise in socially constructed ideology. Sartre’s liking for jazz provides an excellent
example that colors the idea we have been describing: in and of itself, the art form achieves no
privileged status at unlocking authentic modes of being. Moreover, to the extent that jazz is
unconsciously valued for its implicit endorsement of counter-culture, its pursuit is resolutely
inauthentic. Only through a conscious, genuine articulation of its value and that value’s origins can
the individual hope for it to germinate into authentic self-expression—such articulation is available
to anyone, regardless of the conception of self.
Let us return to the example of Foucault for a moment. In many ways, his life as a public
intellectual was a ground project shaped by a deeper desire to attract beauty, informed by the
meaning and value he bestowed on that desire. Irrespective of the source material (i.e. contingent
circumstances) that effected his eventual development, the extent that he was able to articulate his
actions and motives is a clear indication that his life, at least at the moment of the interview, was
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lived authentically. Ground projects need not express that which is essential to the core of our
being and desires need not be created ex nihilo to be meaningful. Foucault’s authenticity lies in his
self-awareness regarding his desires and his conscious decision to select how those desires mattered
and manifested on a practical level. He recognized the source of his thoughts and behaviors and
understood that living an inauthentic past does not preclude the possibility of an authentic future,
nor does an authentic present guarantee the existence of an authentic future. This is an experience
of constant becoming, and the authentic person who thinks himself to have attained it permanently
must beware to ensure that his authentic responses do not backslide into devious manifestations of
ideology.
On the off chance that our first point has gotten lost in the sauce, let us remember that we
were defending neither the existence nor the non-existence of the self. Our intention was instead to
show that authenticity, properly perceived, is possible within either framework, a conclusion that
does not always seem as obvious given some of the more traditional conceptions of it, but which
we hope passes muster following our explication, as it amounts to this. As Sartre was fond of
saying, “Man is condemned to be free.” 115 In much the same way, we are condemned to live our
lives, to have immense concern for our desires and ground projects, and feel pressure from without
attempting to thwart our efforts to realize them. Inasmuch as authenticity offers a practical
foundation for responding to these phenomena, its value remains germane. That said, if our
treatment of these issues is neither sufficient nor appealing, then I invite the reader to skip to the
concluding remarks. If, however, our work thus far has proven both convincing and evocative, read
on for a rough and ready guide to authentic living. I hope the following will prove beneficial to
those who wish to revolutionize their daily lives not through an ideologically imposed sense of duty

Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, trans. Philip Mairet, ed. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Meridian, 1957).
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with its attendant guilt, self-sacrifice, and self-deadening oughts, but through a genuine return to the
desires of the individual and the actions that flow from them.
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IV.

A User’s Manual
Somewhere down the line, many of us arrive at the unfortunate conclusion that it is

impossible to realize our life’s desires. Armed with this realization, we redirect our efforts from
fighting for ourselves to fighting for some external cause or ideal instead. These pursuits appear noble
on the surface, but pulling back their thin veil reveals a people that have accepted alienation from
their desires as their modus vivendi. All decisions, conscious or otherwise, to subjugate personal desires
to the edicts of these inauthentic causes and ideals are necessarily reactionary rather than
revolutionary because they initially arose through an act of resistance. Nevertheless, one of the most
well kept secrets of our lackluster, though potentially splendid lives is that daily living can be
rapturous. Despite the suffocating forces of politics, religion, and culture that press from all sides,
the world is ripe with instances of people who do learn how to live authentically. Naturally, we
jumpstart this process internally by reclaiming our own minds via consciously and critically thinking
for ourselves rather than mindlessly absorbing the predigested opinions of others.
This section, then, is a user’s manual for those who wish to live authentically, the blueprints
for the synthesis of a consciously assembled core of thought for our personal, rather than
ideological, use. This core of thought will be an invaluable companion in our efforts to understand
why our life is the way it is and how to navigate it. Above all, this thought (i.e. our theory) will be
developed alongside and give rise to conscious action (i.e. our practice). Without this vital link, which
so much contemporary moral theory has tragically abandoned, our ethics is worthless—a caged
beast at best, a lifeless corpse at worst. The world of ideas divorced from deeds will keep latent
desires trapped in purgatory until the two reunite. Molding our own practical-theory, which is to say
living authentically, is a necessary co-requisite to realizing our desires. Therefore, forging and living
out our practical-theory is synonymous with a rapturous existence. The process is simultaneously
destructive and creative—destructive in the sense that we must decolonize our minds from
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unconsciously adopted ideologies to make room for our practical-theory; creative in the sense that
we must reinhabit that space with our newly minted practical-theory from which authenticity will
bloom. Centered on what we want from life, the journey to attain the fulfillment of these desires is
an adventure in and of itself, and our practical-theory is the authentic means by which we travel—
humorous enough to keep our spirits high in the face of adversity, evocative enough to sustain our
interest in the face of the longest trip we will ever take.
Before we press on, some words on the nature of the beast are in order. An ideology is
hereby understood as any system of ideas that, at its core, boils down to an abstraction, which
comes packaged with an associated set of duties. Though seemingly innocuous, the ideology inverts
our orientation by directing it away from ourselves, often unconsciously. Consequently, those who
adhere to a given ideology are twisted to behave as objects rather than subjects, their will repurposed
for service of the ideology’s ends rather than their own. Though the abstraction at the core of each
ideology is different, structurally they are all the same: a power-hungry group seeks to consolidate
even more power to itself by drawing on the seemingly limitless supply of herd animals it can invite
into its fold. Yearning for a purpose like everybody else, and yet unable to provide it for themselves,
members of the herd sacrifice their autonomy, submit their will, and suffer accordingly for the
illusory rewards these extended family organizations proffer. Perhaps the world’s oldest and most
obvious example, religion operates by exchanging undying affection for the promise of eternal life.
The Abrahamic God in particular is projected as the universe’s ultimate subject, under which every
human being is His object to manipulate at will. Under the guise of capitalism, the same ideological
structure organizes itself: Profit is the ultimate subject of world, guiding human activity by means of
the invisible hand. In a deliberate move, the overt mysticism of Christianity was replaced by the
secular and scientific, though no less devotional, worship of technology and consumerism. On the
other side of the world, the same structure is recycled and dubbed communism—the State becomes
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the ultimate subject who promises to lead the object, the proletariat, to the Promised Land on a
different road. The recent rise of New Age movements suggests that we may be reverting to a
modified version of the religious ideologies of old. Offering an antinode to the inward emptiness
that results from excessive worship of the Consumer God, the woo-woo mysticism of these subtle
ideologies functions like an escapist drug trip to simultaneously salvage our mental health while
repressing revolutionary impulses.
In essence, ideology is authentic practical-theory flipped on its head: subject and object are
inverted, abstractions take on the human characteristics of desire and will while human beings take
on the instrumental characteristics of tools designed to service the abstraction’s ends. While the
particular sacrifices demanded and the specific rewards offered differ, the same basic structure is
maintained through each subsequent iteration of the ultimate subject (e.g. God, Profit, the State,
etc.). In the interest of further cementing the ideology’s power, the daily lives and desires of
individuals are separated further and further from the rudderless world they live in until the two
scarcely recognize one another. Sufficiently separated from our own subjectivity, ideologies then
demand our allegiance in the form of various duties and sacrifices designed to protect those in
power at the expense of the individual, and if the preceding separation is divisive enough, we barely
notice it. Our subservience and docility is cloaked in noble causes and ideals that nevertheless
redirect our personal will toward desires that sustain the dominant ideology’s authority: ‘the
common good,’ ‘national security,’ ‘the war effort,’ ‘free speech’—the list goes on and the
relationship stays the same. Ideology masquerades as direct route to our desires, but in truth only
offers us a vicarious relationship with the world.
We strip ideology of its squatter’s rights by constantly inquiring within ourselves: How do I
feel right now? How is my life going? What do I want? Am I getting what I want? If not, why not,
and how can I? On the surface, this is a deceptively simple practice, yet it is one that is easily
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neglected. Our lives are happening in every moment, each moment as significant as the next, and
without a consciousness of our life in daily routine, we will never be able to revolutionize it. Those
who haven’t turned inward in some time may be surprised to find just how much information we are
disclosing to ourselves all the time if we choose to become receptive to it. Each day that we deepen
this practice, we reorient ourselves as the subject of our lives, and ideology slowly loosens its
stranglehold on our desires as we continually expose it for what it is.
So, the construction of practical-theory is based on being fully aware of your desires and
their legitimacy, and using that awareness to begin thinking for yourself and acting autonomously.
The New Agers and their merry band of therapy mongers, diversity awareness trainers, and
politically correct leftists speak of ‘consciousness raising,’ but what they really have in mind is a
furthering of the systems that be by subduing perpetrators with guilt inducing, ideological narcotics.
True consciousness raising only occurs authentically, by encouraging people to identify with their
desires rather than imposed morality. Only through this type of awareness, free of normalized guilt,
can a radical subjectivity ripe for transforming our worlds come into being.
As Nietzsche knew, the halfway point on the road from self-negation to self-affirmation is
nihilism—no travelers are exempt. We enter through the lucid recognition that our daily existence
contains no real living and begin to register the distinction between living and surviving. Standing
motionless at the halfway mark, we invert the poles: subject and object are restored to their proper
place, ideology is rejected in favor of desires and an overwhelming will to be—nothing else is true.
The upside-down pyramid in which corporations say, “I love you,” and their products want to
befriend you are no longer glossed over as another everyday spectacle. Common ‘wisdom’ (e.g.
“Life’s not fair,” “You can’t always get what you want,” You win some, you lose some”) is revealed
for the sedative that it is, the Eucharist of the secular religion of Just Getting By. These clichés,
which are collectively dubbed ‘common sense’ are seen as the pernicious rhetoric of self-alienation.

76

Slowly, we begin to realize that we have been fooled (or were fooling ourselves) into trading in the
possibility of an authentic life for ourselves in return for the security that accompanies its
representation.
Consequently, many nihilists feel the urge to destroy the system which has been destroying
them. The simulacrum of the old world no longer delivers in the way that it used to, so they must
devise a practical-theory to reorient themselves in light of what they now know. Unfortunately for
many nihilists, however, this practical-theory never congeals as self-alienation gives way to social
alienation. Alive but lonely, they lash out blindly grope about for an anti-social role they believe will
compensate them for the time and sanity they feel cheated out of, though a role nonetheless (e.g. the
suicidal, the vandal, the vigilante, the nightwalker, the mental hospital regular). Their collective
failing, of course, is the failure to realize that there are others who can empathize. By finding other
nihilists to work with, the solitary rage of the individual can be positively channeled via participation
in a collective project of self-actualization.
This symbiotic project of transforming self and society in tandem was originally deemed
politics, though our current political spectacle bears little resemblance to this model. The sheer
possibility that an individual can either be interested or not interested in politics, the same way we
may or may not be interested in basketball, bird watching, or beat boxing shows just how distanced
we have become from a process that was designed to feel very intimate. Representatives, lobbyists,
and think tanks further this divide and convince us that any effort to change the structure of the
system is futile, so few bother to try (which only fortifies the system further). Rather than help
individuals understand how and why this system contributes to their alienation, present therapeutic
tactics are designed to ‘help’ the individual maintain sanity and productivity amidst a sea of banality
and restrictive social roles. Effectively treating role playing as the symptom rather than the cause of
alienation, the practice of pretending, concealing, and repressing our desires is offered as treatment.
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Conversely, authentic therapy endorses changing our lives rather than adjusting to the role. The
necessary link between self-therapy and collective-therapy is emphasized and politics reclaims its
status as the vehicle through which we work on society by working on ourselves. Once a critical
mass of individuals consciously chooses to disassociate from their roles and communicate
authentically, society follows suit.
To live authentically is to make our lives—how they are and how we would like them to
be—the center of our awareness. This refocusing is achieved not only by noting our own center, but
by noting where it is being pressed on from the outside by means of false issues, false dichotomies,
and false identities. Given that these are the most insidious types of external pressure that preclude
us from living authentically, we will take a moment to examine each of them.
The media is really to blame for the mass distraction endemic to our society A worthwhile
analysis and understanding of the nature of systems and how they operate is all but drowned out by
the most trivial of cultural details, supporting our troops, casual drug use, and sex scandals all
included. We are encouraged to become so opinionated on every trifling issue that our opinion on the
only issue that matters for us becomes lost in the sauce: How we live. Philosophy itself can be a
particularly egregious combatant here, though the public’s watered down version fairs no better, as
evidenced by the lone conversational question that asserts itself again and again: “What’s your
philosophy of life?” As if the necessarily abstract answer could ever get to the heart of the matter!
Our philosophy of life can be deduced through our actions alone, and no amount of pontificating to
the contrary can diminish the significance of what we are doing right now.
Hunter S. Thompson has a line in his letter on the meaning of life: “Let’s assume that you
think you have a choice of eight paths to follow (all predefined of course). And let’s assume that you
can’t see any real purpose in any of the eight. Then—and here is the essence of all I’ve said—you
must find a ninth path.” In essence, he is emboldening us to reject the false dichotomies heaped on us
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by social structures. We can see these everywhere: economic prosperity versus a healthy ecosystem,
capitalism versus socialism, democrat versus republican. By forcing us to pick sides and tacitly accept
the choices authorities present us as the only ones available, they divide, conquer, and preserve their
power. Again, only by rejecting the choices we are given and reclaiming our power to choose our
own choices can we manifest the creativity necessary to realize our desires, which, upon closer
inspection, rarely fit into these ready-made categories.
False identities divide us in even subtler and more insidious ways. Lacking an immediate and
meaningful community, people feel forced to make one up for themselves by associating with a
messy host of illusory social identities—these are closely linked to social roles and are often
precipitated by the state, religious, and cultural ideologies in a vicious power cycle. They are often so
multiplicitous that it is easy to image a person who simultaneously identifies as an American, a
Baptist, a Southerner, a patriot, a homosexual, and a Cowboys fan, the conglomeration of which
makes up the self. Of course, some of these are more potent identifications than others, but at
bottom they all service the same conditioned desire to belong and have the side effect of masking
the more bedrock characteristics of our place in society. And this is to say nothing of the fact that a
closer look at something as simple as driving to work every morning negates the significance of
many of these roles. During our commute, we intrinsically link ourselves with the untold millions of
people who extracted and forged the aluminum and steel used to make the car, the workers on the
assembly line, and the crash-test safety drivers who determine if the vehicle is roadworthy, as well as
the people in the fossil fuel and electrical industry who powered the plant the car was manufactured
at. Add the people who transported the car to a dealership, the salesperson who sold the car, and the
records keepers who recorded the transaction, and finally, the people who provided the sustenance
for all those workers to survive while they brought the car to you—and we haven’t even mentioned
the infrastructure construction itself! This exercise could be extended, without dilution, to include
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the entirety of the world’s population. They create our lives, and we create theirs. How can social
identities maintain their rigidity in the face of this pervasive interconnectedness? If anything, the real
social identity that emerges in light of all these relations is that of the struggler fighting to reclaim her
own life for herself. The prerequisite for reclaiming our lives, as we have been pointing at, is the
rejection of all the false issues, dichotomies, and identities and placing ourselves at the center of the
empty space left in their wake. From there, we can expand outward without being caught in the daze
of these hindrances.
Having dismissed these external false idols, we must be careful not to construct internal false
idols of our own by avoiding the twin pillars of cynicism and absolutism. As black-and-white as it gets,
absolutism is the comprehensive and outright acceptance or rejection of particular ideologies. In a
sense, the absolutist sets up a false dichotomy of their own by insisting that total rejection or total
acceptance are the only choices available. Wandering through the life in search of an ideal, the
absolutist, upon seeing that which resembles his ideal, proceeds to buy it hook, line, and sinker
without a second thought. But the ideological market is only fit for looting—practically speaking, it
is much wiser for us to move through the stalls, take what looks authentic and useful, and discard
the rest. The cynic, on the other hand, rejects everything out of hand, though along similar lines as
the absolutist. He has simply given up on finding his ideal and subsequently takes this strategy of
complete denial to its ultimate conclusion by refusing to acknowledge that we can accept part and
parcel without reverting to buying wholesale.
Living authentically, we understand that we can repurpose anything so long as we are
conscious of where it came from and how we intend to use it, including ideologies. If we have the
self-awareness and know-how, there is nothing inherently evil about ideology—we just need to reenvision our relationship with it and diversify our portfolio. One of the primary problems with
haphazardly and uncritically drawing on a large range of ideological source material is that
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contradictions are bound to crop up, and these contradictions will frustrate our desires from the
inside even further. In the process of formulating our own practical-theory, we will have to dissolve
whatever contradictions arise between new and old thought, perception, action, as well as continuing
to add, subtract, and tweak our current worldview to incorporate new information as we receive it.
This makes for a dynamic activity in which a way of life has opportunity to emerge as a synergistic
compound of its constituent parts.
As we have alluded to resistance to the authentic construction of our own practical theory
will be felt from groups across the ideological spectrum, including those superficially opposed to one
another. Politicians, clergy, New Age gurus, law enforcement officials, teachers, corporations, social
justice warriors, feminists, misogynists, white supremacists, landlords, capitalists, and socialists—
anyone who has a stake in alienating us from our desires to further their own power trip sustained
by domination in any of its forms will take issue with our project through whatever avenue suits
them best. Given that they have something to lose by individuals taking back their own lives, they
will undoubtedly fight against this, but the only way out for us is through. If we cannot reevaluate
the totality of daily existence through the lens of our desires, then we will continue to find ourselves
caught in quicksand.
As we near the end, a word of caution: as we mentioned toward the beginning, mere
recognition of these systems of power and oppression and the ways in which they operate is not
enough to free us from their prisons and realign ourselves with our desires. Though the collective
sedation of several billion people only makes our projects all the more difficult, we must remember
that practical-theory is not enough unless it translates into observable action. Practice without theory
is ineffective but theory without practice is inert—the two must be conjoined if we are to eradicate
our self-alienation from our desires, live authentically, and transform society in our likeness through
example. Without practice, we run the risk of our theory unintentionally sedating ourselves, employed
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as a defense mechanism so that we might not have to face that we are further from our desires than
our technical know-how seems to dictate. On the other end of the spectrum, without theory we will
unconsciously adopt someone else’s, from the social justice warrior to the gangbanger. In other
words, our practical theory is a means to an end, not an end in itself. If we want to act authentically
and effectively toward the gratification of our desires, then we must think authentically and
effectively. Only those who assemble a theory of why the world is upside down will be able to turn it
right side up. A spontaneous, solitary revolution may suffice momentarily, but without the requisite
theory in place beforehand, these actions will see their fruits co-opted and twisted to the betterment
of ends that are not their own before they realize what has happened. If authentic self-revolution is
what we seek, we will have to consciously and consistently dissolve the unconscious ideologies of
old and act on our new understanding in a coherent way. If this revolution is to balloon to the
collective level, then we must somehow arrive at a critical mass of individuals thinking, acting, and
living authentically.
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V.

Conclusion
We have secured the potential solution of three problems: the what, the so what, and the

now what. Like a set of Russian dolls, the first is of vast extent, touching upon the relationship of
authenticity and inauthenticity; the second (provided we accept the nature of the relationship thus
described) explains why we should care about the relationship just sketched; the third inscribes itself
within the interior of the first two by describing what we should do with the resultant interpretation
(provided we see its value). Each part of the solution rests on information gleaned from the
preceding level of analysis and ultimately revolves around the role of authenticity in the evolution of
a life more meaningful and satisfying than we might otherwise achieve through the lens of primarily
external theory. Though the material covered was too vast for there to be any hope of providing a
definitive answer, we have nevertheless considered both the evolution of authenticity to its present
form, the steps it must take to defend itself from naysayers, and the possible outcome of an
authentic life within the context of modern society in the hope that we might shed light on one. This
simple structure has supplied us with a few conclusions.
From Kierkegaard to Nietzsche to Heidegger to Sartre to Camus and beyond, authenticity
collects its subject matter, and from our individual personas it takes its form. It has maintained the
profound supremacy and unparalleled truth of subjectivity, dealing with all of the difficulties that
come alongside the objections raised. And while authenticity certainly did not condone the
disconcerting way in which the dissidents posed their problems, it managed to embrace them under
a skeptical outlook without resorting to pointing a preaching finger at those who preach without a
whiff of irony. This much at least remains for certain, but many other difficulties remain with the oft
contradictory conceptions of authenticity championed by its most unabashed proponents. For
example, the role Heidegger played in the constitution of a universal ontology of authenticity, or the
contribution of Kierkegaard’s authenticity to the support of religious dogma, or the multiple
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additional influences we have eliminated: Sartre’s radical freedom, Nietzsche’s amor fati, the primacy
of Bernard Williams’ ground projects. Without a common understanding of authenticity, we would
find it impossible to meet the challenges posed by the objections to authenticity in a coherent and
convincing manner. This much is obvious. Our resultant synthesis, emphasizing the main themes of
authenticity within our inherently subjective center of inquiry, cover the distance needed to dispel
authenticity’s most recurring problems.
This much we hope is obvious, but let us review the evidence. We exposed the assumption
that authenticity tends toward egoistic self-indulgent thought and action for the caricature that it is,
revealing that authenticity often endorses an active engagement with the social world in order to
orient itself and construct meaning. We spoke briefly of the wrongs which authenticity seems to, if
not condone, at least turn a blind eye to before critically examining the de facto structure it purports
to rest on. The underlying circular logic of these objections, founded on a moral system that has not
been justified had to be delved into before proceeding further. Given that authenticity is not the
object of a moral doctrine, we looked more closely at the overreaching powers typically granted to
the moral ought. On the contrary, we argued that we must operate according to the knowledge
disclosed to us by inner subjectivity, which remains unbound by the spellbinding rhetoric of a
decadent morality. And finally, we explored the historical conception of the nature of the self and
subsequently offered a conception of morality that retains its sense regardless of the internal
metaphysics presupposed.
All objections aside, is it possible finally, at the end of this study, to determine the objective
appeal and efficacy of an authentic life? Does such a concept even exist? The question remains
unresolved. In fact, it is a particular paradox of the human spirit to accept the theoretical premises
and still not be able to embrace their practical synthesis, an ethical paradox in which one can
acknowledge the knowledge contained within the facts presented, and yet still find them insufficient
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to move us to action. Sufficient in theory, but yet incomplete in practice, this paradox is rooted in
the irrational aspects of human psychology and our conception of self in which a perception of the
constituent parts fails to render their profound unity accessible in lived experience. In that regard,
our user’s manual cannot deliver us from our anxiety, and restoring the incomparable novelty of
authenticity through words alone seems an impossible task. Though we can appeal to our malleable
inner landscape through the evocative language of authenticity, we still feel no less that so long as
authenticity is demonstrated through thought foreign to our own, we will fail to recognize it as
anything more than a brief respite of inspiration at best and empty words at worst. If the true impact
of authenticity is to resonate with us on the level we can only allude to in these pages, the real work
must start with the reader in lived experience on no uncertain terms.
And if we reflect on the major themes of authenticity (subjectivity, desire, ground projects,
self-awareness, presence) we recognize that what counts here is the substitution of man qua man
with ourselves. The difference that we ascertain in the cases we apply it to show that Kant, stowed
away in Königsberg outlining his doctrine of duty, and the young man, endeavoring to carefully
examine his life on his own terms, are, in truth, closer than they realize given that the only possible
vantage point for us is a subjective one. Moreover, if we, concurring with Nietzsche, accept that
universal moral theories we discussed at the heart of this work—consequentialism, deontology, and
virtue ethics—are simply the manifestations of particular, albeit incredibly filled out, perspectives,
we must agree that the authentic individual possesses the capabilities needed to catalyze an ethical
renaissance in comparison with dogmatism in all its forms. “Truth,” said Krishnamurti, “is a pathless
land.” 116 The whole authentic effort opposes itself to the unconscious acceptance of authoritative
morality. The authentic individual thereby defines himself and, by extension, the world he would like
Jiddu Krishnamurti, “The Core of the Teachings,” J. Krishnamurti Online, October 21, 1980, http://www.jkrishnamurti.org/aboutkrishnamurti/the-core-of-the-teachings.php. The rest of the passage reads: “Man cannot come to it through any organization, through
any creed, through any dogma, priest, or ritual, not through any philosophical knowledge or psychological technique. He has to find it
through the mirror of relationship, through the understanding of the contents of his own mind, through observation and not through
intellectual analysis or introspective dissection.”
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to see. Christopher Lasch, in his article, “The Narcissist Society,” speaks of authenticity as a “cult of
expanded consciousness, health, and personal ‘growth’…to live for the moment [and]—to live for
yourself.” 117 In some sense this is true, but not in the way the author would like.
Be that as it may, by the death of Kant, the seed of authenticity was planted in the fertile soil
of philosophy. It has now sufficiently grown to resist the barrage of criticism that every
revolutionary idea is subjected to in turn. For some, it remains an unassailable hope and effective
shield against the self-negating dissatisfaction infected by morality’s imposing shadow. The authentic
life thereby achieves its practical potential.
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Christopher Lasch, “The Narcissistic Society,” The New York Review of Books, September 30, 1976, §1.
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